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INTRODUCTION 
Legal materials do not answer legal questions, people do.1 
 
uthority is the foundation of legal analysis. Our legal system is 
based on the rule of law ideal,2 and law is well understood to be 
“an authority-soaked practice.”3 In contrast to many other fields, or 
everyday decision-making and reasoning processes, law places greater 
reliance “on the source rather than the content (or even the correctness) 
of ideas, arguments, and conclusions.”4 Legal analysis without the 
explicit support of appropriate authority is perceived as illegitimate,5 
as evidenced by the profession’s emphasis on the value of abundant 
citations. Use of legal authority is one of the very first concepts 
introduced to every first-year law student and one of a lawyer’s most 
essential responsibilities. 
As commonly defined, the concept of authority “requires one to let 
authoritative directives pre-empt one’s own judgement. One should 
comply with them whether or not one agrees with them.”6 Thus, 
authority is often referred to as “content-independent” in that the 
reasons for following it do not come from its content but from its 
status.7 In Hannah Arendt’s words, “[I]f authority is to be defined at 
1 STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 317 (2001). 
2 “Traditionally, as we know, the term [rule of law] has meant two distinct though related 
things: that legal cases are to be decided according to their legal merits rather than according 
to the personal merits of the litigants (this is the law’s impersonality and the judge’s duty of 
disinterestedness); and that even the highest officials in society are subject to the law rather 
than being above (immune from) it.” RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 354–55 
(2008). 
3 Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of 
Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 497 (2000) [hereinafter Schauer & Wise, Delegalization]. 
4 Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1934 (2008) 
[hereinafter Schauer, Authority]. 
5 “The judge has an obligation to justify his decision in legal terms (‘a government of 
laws’); by failing to cite authority, he has failed to inform and convince the parties, counsel 
and the public of the legal basis of the decision . . . . [t]he obligation to cite authority seems 
indisputable.” John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of 
the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CALIF. 
L. REV. 381, 418 (1977).
6 Joseph Raz, Introduction to AUTHORITY, 1, 5 (Joseph Raz ed., N.Y. Univ. Press 1990).
7 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON
BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 243 (1982) [hereinafter 
HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM]; Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1936–37; JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW & NATURAL RIGHTS 233–34 (2d ed. 2011) (“One treats something (e.g. an 
opinion, a pronouncement, a map, an order, a rule. . .) as authoritative if and only if one 
treats it as giving one sufficient reason for believing or acting in accordance with it 
A 
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all, then, it must be in contradistinction to both coercion by force and 
persuasion through argument.”8 This definition of authority is entirely 
consistent with the use of “binding” or “mandatory” authority in the 
American legal system—lawyers and judges must follow mandatory 
authority regardless of whether they agree with its content. 
However, in the legal realm, use of the term authority is not limited 
to binding authority that must be followed; the term is regularly used 
to describe nonbinding information as well. Nonbinding authority is 
defined entirely in the negative: it is any information that legal authors 
are not obliged to follow. As such, it is the very antithesis of authority 
as classically defined.  
The very idea of authority without any accompanying duty to obey 
it seems paradoxical on its face, and yet this tension has barely been 
explored.9 This is likely because the conventional wisdom regarding 
nonbinding (or “persuasive”) authority is that legal authors rely upon it 
only when persuaded by its substantive content.10 As such, it is not 
authority at all in the classical sense. It does seem logical that a legal 
author would voluntarily cite to material only if persuaded by its 
content. However, this conventional wisdom is contradicted by 
common practice and has been convincingly debunked by Frederick 
Schauer.11 Persuasive authority is often cited for reasons independent 
of its content, for authoritative reasons,12 and thus persuasive authority 
has “weight” beyond its substantive merits. This weight—the 
authoritative weight of persuasive authority—has been analyzed by a 
notwithstanding that one cannot oneself otherwise see good reason for so believing or acting, 
or cannot evaluate the reasons one can see, or sees some countervailing reason(s), or would 
oneself otherwise (i.e. in the absence of what it is that one is treating as authoritative) have 
preferred not so to believe or act.”). 
8 R. B. Friedman, On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy, in AUTHORITY, 
56, 63 (Joseph Raz ed., N.Y. Univ. Press 1990) (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST 
AND FUTURE 91, 93 (1963)). 
9 Professor Frederick Schauer is the primary exception. See Schauer, Authority, supra 
note 4. 
10 See, e.g., CHRISTINE COUGHLIN, JOAN MALMUD ROCKLIN & SANDY PATRICK, A 
LAWYER WRITES 24 (2d ed. 2013) (“Although a court is not required to rely on or follow 
case law from another jurisdiction, a court may do so if it finds the reasoning expressed in 
that case law to be persuasive and consistent with the law from the court’s jurisdiction.”); 
STEVEN M. BARKAN, ROY M. MERSKY & DONALD J. DUNN, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL 
RESEARCH 2 (9th ed. 2009). 
11 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1931; see also Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 
43 HOUS. L. REV. 1143, 1201–02 (2006); Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive 
Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55, 80–81 (2009). 
12 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1944. 
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few scholars,13 but it is generally disregarded. Instead, the prevailing 
and persistent conventional wisdom is that persuasive authority is 
chosen solely for the persuasive power of its substantive content, and 
few people appear to be troubled by its label as authority. Persuasive 
authority can be selected any which way or completely ignored; this 
characteristic is, in general, simply accepted as part of the current legal 
system. 
Meanwhile, the concept of legal authority, which once included only 
a limited set of materials, has become diluted: the term is now used 
simply to refer to any and all information cited in legal analysis.14 
Significantly, authority now includes information of almost any sort—
sources now used regularly in legal analysis fall well outside the strictly 
defined universe of legal sources lawyers once relied upon.15 Recent 
dramatic changes in access to information have only increased the 
diversity of sources used in legal analysis today; the trend has received 
plenty of attention.16 At the same time, a rise in statutes and 
administrative law has displaced common law as the dominant source 
of law. This “statutorification”17 of law, in turn, has led to the creation 
of entire subfields of analysis addressing the appropriate weight and 
role of external sources to interpret enacted law, such as administrative 
agency interpretations, legislative history, canons of construction, or 
dictionaries. As a result, the largely undifferentiated category of 
persuasive authority includes everything from interpretive tools (such 
as legislative history and canons of construction) to sources that are not 
legal at all (such as empirical studies from other disciplines). 
Nevertheless, the ubiquitous “hierarchy of authority,” which 
categorically excludes all nonbinding authority, remains the beginning 
13 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1932; see also Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1196; 
Flanders, supra note 11, at 62. 
14 “Attorneys use the words ‘sources’ and ‘authorities’ and ‘support for an argument’ 
interchangeably. Each is a catch-all reference to the materials used to analyze and predict 
the outcome of a legal issue.” COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 16; “An authority refers 
to any cited source courts and attorneys use to oppose or support a legal proposition.” DAVID 
ROMANTZ & KATHLEEN VINSON, LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE FUNDAMENTAL SKILL 15 (2d ed. 
2009). Whether the term “authority” should be used to refer to everything cited in legal 
argument is not a settled question, but it is beyond the scope of this Article. 
15 Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 305, 311 (2000). 
16 See, e.g., id. at 311; Schauer & Wise, Delegalization, supra note 3, at 510; Ellie 
Margolis, Authority Without Borders: The World Wide Web and the Delegalization of Law, 
41 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 912 (2011). 
17 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982). 
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and end of most efforts to provide a schema of legal authority.18 The 
traditional model of authority provides a standardized set of rankings 
for a narrow category of sources, using only two binary distinctions: 
binding/nonbinding and primary/secondary. For many reasons, not 
least of which is the indeterminacy of law,19 the use of authority is far 
more complex—and interesting—than these simple distinctions 
suggest. 
The hierarchy of binding authority, arguably the most prominent of 
authority metaphors, is a poor fit for the reality of authority. It depicts 
the weight of authority as all-or-nothing and permanently fixed; both 
of these characteristics are inaccurate. This traditional view has long 
maintained a steadfast description of The Law as a narrow set of 
unchanging sources, offering no explanation for why legal decision 
makers cite to nonbinding sources at all. Meanwhile, the number and 
type of sources used in legal analysis continue to expand. There are no 
signs that the increase in acceptable legal sources will be reversed any 
time soon; we live in an information age, and it is hard to imagine a 
movement that would successfully curtail the use of available sources. 
The chasm between the traditional description of legal authority and 
the actual practice of authority grows ever larger. This Article argues 
for a better, holistic view and understanding of all sources used in legal 
analysis and their characteristics. The way that lawyers, judges, law 
students, and professors talk and think about authority is important. It 
shapes the profession’s understanding of legal analysis.20 We need 
18 The term “hierarchy of authority” is used colloquially as a way to refer to the overall 
hierarchy of laws (constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions) and also as a way to refer 
only to the judicial hierarchy. See, e.g., KRISTEN KONRAD TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL 
WRITERS (2d ed. 2016) (see chapter subheading “Hierarchy of Authority”); DERNBACH ET 
AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING AND LEGAL METHOD 11–13 (5th ed. 2013) 
(using subheadings “Hierarchy of Law” and “Hierarchy of Judiciary”). Materials published 
for practitioners are similar. See Terry Jean Seligmann & Thomas H. Seymour, Choosing 
and Using Legal Authority: The Top 10 Tips, PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. AND WRITING 
(W. Grp.), Vol. 6 Fall 1997, at 3 (Tip number three states, “Remember the Hierarchy of 
Authority.”). Practitioners receive similar advice. See, e.g., Susan W. Fox & Wendy S. 
Loquasto, The Art of Persuasion Through Legal Citations, 84 Fla. B.J. 49, 49 (2010) 
(advising practitioners to “Choose Your Citations Based Upon the Hierarchy of 
Authority.”). I cite these simply to show that the concept of a hierarchy of authority is 
common.  
19 The indeterminacy of law is a deep and rich field of scholarship; there is a wide range 
of views on just how indeterminate the law is, a philosophical debate beyond the scope of 
this Article. See also infra notes 22 and 176. 
20 “[t]he forms of law mark . . . the ways in which we think and do law and the ways in 
which we imagine its future. This is true of both the most ethereal legal theory and the most 
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better vocabulary, metaphors, and descriptive tools for sources used in 
legal argument in order to address the underlying critical questions of 
what courts treat as law and why they do so. 
Part I of this Article describes the conventional view of legal 
authority, a view that is centered on the judicial hierarchy. 
Part II argues that the conventional view of authority, with its closed 
hierarchical structure, obscures many of the important characteristics 
of legal authority. This view oversimplifies a highly complex practice. 
The two predominant classifications (binding/nonbinding and primary/ 
secondary) are too blunt. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
nonbinding authority is often relied on for its status rather than (or in 
addition to) its content. As a result, the weight of authority is not limited 
to two categories of all or none (binding or nonbinding) but is better 
described as a continuum. Second, the conventional view of authority 
as a fixed hierarchy has no means of recognizing the ongoing evolution 
of both the weight and origin of acceptable sources. The hierarchy of 
authority is thus substantially incomplete and inaccurate. 
Part III proposes reorienting our view of authority as a pluralistic 
practice rather than a fixed hierarchical list and begins the task of 
creating a more nuanced and holistic account of legal authority. The 
existing binary scheme is of little use in contested jurisprudential 
questions. For hard legal questions,21 it tells us nothing about what 
down-to-earth legal argument.” Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 1047, 1109 (2002).
21 “Hard” legal questions include those that cannot be easily resolved by the
straightforward application of rules. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CALIF. 
L. REV. 399, 410 (1985) [hereinafter Schauer, Easy Cases]; David Lyons, Justification and
Judicial Responsibility, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 178, 180 (1984); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1975) (“Statutes and common law rules are often vague and
must be interpreted before they can be applied to novel cases. Some cases, moreover, raise
issues so novel that they cannot be decided even by stretching or interpreting existing
rules.”). Wilson Huhn describes “hard cases” as “cases where plausible legal arguments may
be created for two contradictory results,” and identifies two categories of difficult cases—
where “the applicable rule of law is ambiguous” or where “the validity of the rule has been
challenged.” Wilson Huhn, The Use and Limits of Syllogistic Reasoning in Briefing Cases,
42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 813, 852, 832 (2002). According to Ronald Dworkin, hard cases
occur “when no settled rule dictates a decision either way.” Dworkin, supra at 1060. Rules
are uncertain, and thus “most authorities are not binding or controlling in an absolute way.”
Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1954.
At the other end of the spectrum, cases where the result is determined by the 
straightforward application of a binding rule are referred to in any number of ways: 
mechanical jurisprudence, “slot-machine jurisprudence,” Merryman, supra note 5, at 421, 
and perhaps most frequently, “easy cases,” Schauer, Easy Cases, supra, at 399. There is no 
consensus on the percentage of cases that are easy, but in those easy cases, the governing 
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sources a decision maker might rely on beyond those that are binding. 
The existing model ignores the element of choice, assuming rules of 
law found within a prescribed set of legal sources dictate legal 
outcomes.22 This oversimplification of authority impedes meaningful 
inquiry into and a deeper understanding of the practice of legal 
authority. Acknowledging the authoritative power of persuasive 
authority allows the exploration of possible theoretical reasons for 
reliance on nonbinding authority—authority used regularly in legal 
analysis, but entirely by choice. Understanding the rationale for citing 
to nonbinding authority will, in turn, help to better explain and predict 
the use of nonbinding sources in legal decision-making. 
A more nuanced understanding of authority is valuable perhaps most 
obviously for law students, who are most likely to be misled by the 
conventional model of authority, and those who teach them. However, 
it is equally important for practitioners and judges (and those who could 
learn from them), who may have developed and internalized a nuanced 
practice of authority but lack a shared conceptual framework or 
vocabulary to articulate it. Finally, an alternative perspective on 
authority encourages further exploration of the complex art of legal 
analysis by scholars: What does it mean for the legal profession if 
sources of authority are essentially unlimited? Does the concept of 
authority in legal analysis remain meaningful? The hierarchy of 
authority purports to represent the universe of legal authority but falls 
far short; as a shortcut of sorts for difficult jurisprudential issues, it 
stands in the way of deeper theoretical insight into what counts as law. 
authorities are not “chosen”—there is no dispute as to which authorities should govern and 
the result they should dictate. Not only is the result “easy,” but the choice of authority is as 
well. 
22 A strictly formalist vision of the legal world has, of course, been heavily critiqued; 
mandatory sources of law are frequently unable to dictate particular legal outcomes. The 
degree to which the law dictates results remains an ongoing debate. “When judges are 
confronted with a precedent that is directly on-point and from an authoritative binding 
source, it appears largely to determine their rulings. This empirical result is quite limited, 
though, as the vast majority of important cases do not have such clear precedential 
direction.” Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain 
Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1177 (2005); see 
also Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 296 (1989) (“Preoccupation 
with controversial appellate and Supreme Court cases engenders the illusion of pervasive 
indeterminacy. Focusing instead on everyday acts governed by law reveals the 
pervasiveness of determinate and correct legal outcomes.”); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects 
of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1644 (2003) (“The 
majority of the cases in the circuit courts admit of a right or best answer and do not require 
the exercise of discretion.”).  
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I 
THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 
Legal authority has long been organized in two uncontroversial 
ways: all legal authority is either mandatory (binding) or persuasive 
(nonbinding) and either primary or secondary. The mandatory/ 
persuasive classification receives almost all the attention in any 
discussion about the weight of authority. The primary/secondary 
classification divides law from not law and offers little else. Both 
classifications serve to perpetuate the myth of a very simple system of 
authority, one in which legal authors need only identify applicable law 
in accordance with an established set of rules (which themselves go 
largely unquestioned). 
A. The Weight of Legal Authority As It Is Conventionally Understood
The central operating principle of legal authority is that in
constructing legal analysis authors must first rely on mandatory 
authority, also known as “binding,” “governing,”23 or “controlling” 
authority, which consists entirely of primary sources (defined below). 
The defining characteristic of authority designated as mandatory is that 
it must be followed regardless of its substantive content.24 The ranking 
of mandatory authorities is undisputed and typically offered without 
any sort of explanation. Constitutions are the highest source of 
authority, followed by legislation,25 and then judicial opinions.26 The 
23 Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner divide case authorities into two categories: 
“governing” and “persuasive.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR 
CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 52 (2008). 
24 Raz, supra note 6; HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 7, at 243, 261–66. 
25 “[T]he principle of legislative supremacy . . . is basic in a democratic political 
system.” STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 129 (3d 
ed. 2007). 
26 In a modern legal system where there are a variety of sources of law, the rule of 
recognition is correspondingly more complex; the criteria for identifying the law are 
multiple and commonly include a written constitution, enactment by a legislature, and 
judicial precedents. In most cases, provision is made for possible conflict by ranking these 
criteria in an order of relative subordination and primacy. It is in this way that in our system 
common law is subordinate to statute. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 101 (2d ed. 
1994); see also RICHARD K. NEUMANN, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: 
STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE 84 (7th ed. 2005). As has often been noted,  
[t]he modern concept of binding precedent—where a single opinion sets the course
on a particular course of law and must be followed by courts at the same level and
lower within a pyramidal judicial hierarchy—came about only gradually over the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Lawyers began to believe that judges
made, not found, the law. This coincided with monumental improvements in the
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relationship between constitutional law, legislative enactments, and 
judicial opinions is typically barely discussed in this context. All the 
specificity in the hierarchy of authority addresses the relative weight of 
judicial opinions alone, with little attention paid to the balance of power 
among institutions.  
Determining which sources are mandatory in a particular case is the 
primary purpose of the hierarchy of authority. Mandatory authority can 
only be identified once a particular jurisdiction—including the specific 
decision-making body within that jurisdiction—has been determined. 
However, once the particular jurisdiction has been identified, the body 
of mandatory authority applicable to a particular problem can usually 
be identified without much difficulty.27 The “hierarchy of authority” 
governing the use of mandatory authority is well established and 
generally uncontroversial. 
Though practices vary slightly by court system, all courts are bound 
by decisions of those courts above them (vertical precedent) and may 
be bound by decisions made by courts at the same level (horizontal 
precedent).28 Vertical precedent is the simplest—courts are bound by 
the decisions of courts above them in the court system hierarchy.29 
Vertical precedent has been described as “an inflexible rule that admits 
of no exception”;30 it is indisputably the strongest form of judicial 
collection and reporting of case authorities. As the concept of law changed and a 
more comprehensive reporting system began to take hold, it became possible for 
judicial decisions to serve as binding authority. 
Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001). 
27 Leaving aside complex choice of law questions, which determine when a court should 
apply the law of another jurisdiction. See generally Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and 
Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (2010) (identifying a number of nonstandard appellate 
processes that do not fit the traditional appellate structure, leaving questions about which 
precedent is binding). 
28 Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015 
(2003) [hereinafter Barrett, Stare Decisis]. 
29 Determining binding authority depends on “choice of law” issues, which can be 
complex. At the risk of oversimplifying, generally “[f]ederal courts defer to state court 
interpretations of state law.” Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior 
Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 825 n.34 (1994) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1938)), and state courts defer to federal courts on issues of federal law, 
AMY SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH 9 (4th ed. 2009). Though important, I leave choice 
of law out of my discussion here as a different threshold question. Choice of law tells the 
court which hierarchy it must follow on a particular issue—once that decision is made the 
traditional rules apply. 
30 Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1711, 1712 (2013) [hereinafter Barrett, Precedent]. 
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authority. However, not every word of a vertical judicial opinion is 
binding; courts are only bound by the holding.31  
Whether horizontal precedent is considered binding depends on the 
jurisdiction. Sometimes horizontal precedent is not binding at all, as in 
most trial courts. In the federal court system, horizontal stare decisis is 
“virtually nonexistent in district courts,” but a “virtually absolute rule 
in courts of appeals.”32 By court rule, federal courts of appeal are bound 
horizontally by earlier panel decisions, unless the court is sitting en 
banc, in which case it is not bound by earlier panel decisions.33 State 
courts vary in their practices, but as a general rule, courts tend not to 
consider themselves bound by horizontal precedent. Some courts—
most notably the U.S. Supreme Court—consider themselves 
horizontally bound by their own previous decisions, but only in a “soft” 
sense.34 As the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly asserted, “[I]t is 
common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable 
command,’”35 and the Court can choose to overrule its own prior 
decisions. This soft version of horizontal precedent carries a lesser 
weight than vertical precedent but greater than nonbinding precedent. 
The very purpose of the hierarchy of authority is to rank authorities 
so that some outweigh others; a case from the highest court in a state 
has more weight than a case from an intermediate court of appeals, 
though both are binding on the trial courts. “It is generally accepted that 
the higher the level of the court that issues a decision, the more 
authoritative the decision will be.”36 But the variation in weight here is 
little explored—the basic idea is that if two decisions are inconsistent 
in any way, the higher decision controls the outcome. 
Only when mandatory authority fails to resolve an issue should legal 
analysts turn to persuasive authority, also referred to as nonbinding, 
nonmandatory, or optional authority.37 The need for persuasive 
authority is often described as the scenario in which mandatory 
31 The distinction between dicta and holding is its own complicated subject. 
32 Barrett, Precedent, supra note 30, at 1713. 
33 Barrett, Stare Decisis, supra note 28, at 1018; Phillip M. Kannan, The Precedential 
Force of Panel Law, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 755, 756 (1993). 
34 Barrett, Precedent, supra note 30, at 1713. 
35 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
36 John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and 
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 499 (1986). 
37 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1946; LAUREL C. OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE 
LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK 57 (5th ed. 2010). 
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authority leaves a “gap” that must be filled.38 Persuasive authority—
which all agree can be either primary or secondary authority—is often 
defined only in contrast to mandatory authority, and “[m]ostly, the term 
is unanalyzed.”39  
The lack of analysis is likely due to the conventional wisdom about 
persuasive authority—that it is a source to be cited for its substantive 
content. Because the decision to follow authority is, by its own terms, 
independent of reason,40 it is logical that when not “bound” a decision 
maker would rely only on other sources for substantive reasons. In 
other words, as its name suggests, persuasive authority is typically 
thought to be used only when its substantive content persuades the 
reader of its merits.41 Or, as one introductory legal research text 
describes it, “[A]uthority can be considered persuasive, meaning that a 
decision-maker can, if so persuaded, follow it.”42 In this view, 
persuasive authority has no place on the hierarchy of authority because 
it has no “weight” apart from the merits of its substantive content, and 
there are no rules directing its application. 
The conventional model of the weight of authority is thus largely 
binary,43 almost entirely focused on the distinction between binding 
and nonbinding authority and the ranking of binding judicial opinions. 
Guidance for, or explanation of, the use of nonbinding authority is 
limited and focused on how to choose judicial opinions from outside 
the governing jurisdiction. This model identifies mandatory authority, 
but otherwise leaves a legal author to her own devices, suggesting that 
the choice of any other authority is essentially ad hoc. 
38 See, e.g., NEUMANN, supra note 26, at 86–88 (“Persuasive authority is used only to 
fill gaps in local law. . . . If you have mandatory authority relevant to your issue, it should 
dominate your analysis. But where you need to fill gaps in the law or want to provide 
additional support, you must choose which persuasive authority to rely on. It would be easier 
if courts adopted uniform and well-defined rules for selecting persuasive authority, but any 
such rules would deprive judges of some of the flexibility and creativity so valuable to 
judicial decision-making.”). 
39 Sullivan, supra note 11. 
40 Raz, supra note 6. (“[Authority] requires one to let authoritative directives pre-empt 
one’s own judgement. One should comply with them whether or not one agrees with 
them.”). 
41 As Chad Flanders notes, substance is not limited to reason; one could be persuaded 
by the emotional content of a source. Flanders, supra note 11, at 65 n.46. 
42 BARKAN, ET AL., supra note 10.  
43 Every introductory legal writing and research textbook this author has seen introduces 
authority using the binary mandatory/persuasive distinction. See, e.g., TERESA J. REID 
RAMBO & LEANNE PFLAUM, LEGAL WRITING BY DESIGN 96–97 (2001); LAUREL CURRIE 
OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK 46–48 (5th ed. 2010). 
62 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 51 
B. The Primary/Secondary Classification
In addition to being sorted as binding or not binding, all legal 
authority is said to fall into one of two categories—either primary or 
secondary. The types of materials within the two categories are 
generally presented as entirely settled. Primary authorities are typically 
defined as “authorities that actually are law,”44 “a statement of the law 
itself,”45 or the authority “produced by a legislature, a court, or some 
other governmental entity with the power to make or determine law.”46 
Primary authority includes constitutions, statutes, administrative rules 
and regulations, and judicial opinions.47 Only primary authority can be 
mandatory, but primary authority is not always mandatory, as the 
binding power of any primary authority is limited to particular 
jurisdictions. 
Secondary authority is often defined simply as “not law” or 
“everything else.”48 Lists of secondary authority almost always look 
the same; they include authorities “that are explanation or commentary 
on primary authorities,”49 such as restatements, treatises, legal 
encyclopedias, and legal scholarship.50 Secondary authority is 
44 LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION 56 
(5th ed. 2010). 
45 ROBERT BERRING, FINDING THE LAW 308 (12th ed. 2005). 
46 NEUMANN, supra note 26, at 82; see also COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 23 (“To 
be mandatory, the authority must emanate from a government body”; primary authorities 
are legislation, administrative rules and regulations, and judicial orders and opinions.)  
47 Note that this is a different definition of primary than is used in other fields—it is a 
primary source of law. In contrast, historians use the term primary sources differently: 
“Primary sources are materials that provide first hand testimony or direct evidence 
concerning a topic under investigation. They are created by the individuals who either 
witnessed or experienced the events or conditions . . . . occurred, but can also be created 
later if based on first hand experiences.” Primary, Secondary & Tertiary Sources Defined, 
USC LIBR. RES. GUIDES (last updated Sep. 18, 2018, 2:21 PM), 
http://libguides.usc.edu/primarysources/home. Legislative history would likely be primary 
under this definition, but it is not a primary source of law. 
48 BERRING, supra note 45 (“everything else is secondary”). 
49 EDWARDS, supra note 44.  
50 For example, Linda Edwards explains that “some authorities are ‘law,’ and some are 
simply commentary on the law or suggestions about what the law ought to be.” She describes 
four basic categories of primary authority: (1) case law created by courts, (2) statutory law 
created by legislatures, (3) administrative law created by governmental agencies, and (4) 
state and federal constitutions. As secondary authority she lists treatises, hornbooks, legal 
encyclopedias, and law review articles. Id. And Neumann’s text explains that “Primary 
authority is produced by a legislature, a court, or some other governmental entity with the 
power to make or determine law. It includes federal and state constitutions, statutes, case 
law, court rules, administrative regulations, and administrative agency decisions.” As 
secondary authority—“not law”—they include restatements, treatises, law review articles 
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presented primarily as an aid to help find, summarize, or understand 
primary rules. Notably, in most introductory lists, sources listed are 
traditional legal materials51—“materials that look legal in the most 
ordinary sense.”52  
Both the secondary and persuasive labels denote little more than 
“other”—not primary and not binding. The core of the introductory 
model of authority is essentially a ranked list of settled mandatory 
sources, a list which has remained the same for the last 200 years. It 
provides a description of authority consistent with a mechanical view 
of the legal world, in which rules determine the outcome of legal 
disputes, as it suggests that legal authors need only identify mandatory 
sources of law to determine the result. Its lack of attention to 
nonbinding sources silently diminishes their significance. 
II 
THE HIERARCHY OF AUTHORITY OBSCURES KEY CHARACTERISTICS 
OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 
The conventional view of authority described above is both binary 
(sources are either binding or they are not) and static (it includes no 
indication that the sources of law or their weight might change over 
time). In both respects, the hierarchical model is significantly flawed 
and incongruent with what appears to be happening in practice.53 
A. The Weight of All Authority Falls Along a Continuum
The phrase “weight of authority” is used frequently to introduce the 
concept of authority.54 Weight, as a metaphor, allows for a nearly 
and other forms of legal scholarship, loose-leaf reporters, and legal encyclopedias and 
dictionaries. NEUMANN, supra note 26, at 82.  
51 Margolis, supra note 16, at 914 (Primary and secondary authority “are legal in the 
sense that they are either direct sources of law or expressly about the law.”). 
52 Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1105 (1997) [hereinafter Schauer & Wise, Legal Positivism] 
(Schauer describes this definition as a “theoretically thin definition of ‘law’ . . . . These 
conceptions start with the idea of law in its most routine and banal sense, and would then 
take ‘legal information’ to include, for example, cases, statutes, constitutional provisions, 
law journals . . . and textbooks and treatises that are plainly about legal doctrine . . . .”) 
Schauer cites Posner’s term “orthodox legal materials.” Id. (quoting Richard Posner, 
Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 9 (1996)). 
53 We need more careful research on the use of optional authority in decision-making. 
54 See, e.g., KUNZ ET AL., THE PROCESS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 8 (7th ed. 2008) (“[S]ome 
law is weightier than the rest.”); SLOAN, supra note 29, at 5; COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 
10, at 24. 
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infinite number of distinctions. But the concept of weight is not well 
explained or explored in conventional views of authority beyond the 
binding (maximum weight) versus nonbinding (no weight) 
distinction.55 The line between the two is generally presented as 
impermeable—either authority is binding or it is not—and the focus of 
the hierarchy of authority is on the task of determining which authority 
is binding. This view implies that persuasive authority has no weight 
independent of its ability to persuade substantively. Without any such 
“weight,” there is, seemingly, little reason to further organize 
persuasive authority—its only significant characteristic is its 
“nonbindingness.” 
Yet several scholars, most notably Schauer, have recognized that 
persuasive authority is not cited solely for the persuasive power of its 
content, but for reasons independent of its content—authoritative 
reasons, reflecting the classic definition of authority.56 The widespread 
view of persuasive authority—that it is used only for its ability to 
persuade with its content—has been convincingly debunked. In 
practice, persuasive authority appears to be regularly cited much like 
mandatory authority: not for its substance but for its status.57 Schauer 
has explained that “[a]lthough courts often cite legal sources because 
55 SLOAN, supra note 29, at 5 (“The degree to which an authority controls the answer to 
a legal question is called the weight of the authority. Not all authorities have the same 
weight. The weight of a legal authority depends on its status as primary or secondary and as 
mandatory or persuasive authority. . . You must be able to distinguish among these 
categories of authority, therefore, to determine how much weight a particular legal authority 
has in the resolution of the issue you are researching.”); see also COUGHLIN, ET AL., supra 
note 10 (Listing table of “Authorities and their weight” in which all weights are listed as 
either mandatory or persuasive and explaining: “Because it is binding, mandatory authority 
is given the most weight in legal analysis . . . . Although a court is not required to rely on or 
follow case law from another jurisdiction, a court may do so if it finds the reasoning 
expressed in that case law to be persuasive and consistent with the law from the court’s 
jurisdiction. In analyzing a client’s legal question, you will likely give more weight to 
mandatory authority than to persuasive authority. However, persuasive authority may still 
be helpful, especially if the binding jurisdiction does not have law addressing the issue or if 
you are advocating for a change in the law.”). 
56 For example, Hart called reasons to follow authority independent of its merits 
“content-independent” reasons. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 7, at 243, 254 
(1982); see generally Schauer, Authority, supra note 4. 
57 Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1203 (“‘[P]ersuasion’ does not accurately express the role 
such precedent plays.”); Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1944; see also Flanders, supra 
note 11, at 75 (“[S]ome persuasive authorities do have an authority ordinarily thought to be 
held only by mandatory authorities.”). Even with the extensive scholarship about the use of 
binding precedent, some have argued that “we have no dominant working theory regarding 
why judges follow precedent . . . .” Lindquist & Cross, supra note 22, at 1159. If there is no 
dominant theory for binding precedent, there is certainly none for persuasive authority.  
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they are genuinely and substantively persuaded, many—perhaps even 
most—judicial uses of so-called persuasive authority seem to stem 
from authority rather than persuasion.”58 For example, a court applying 
a doctrine for the first time might cite to numerous cases in other 
jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine, not for the strength of the 
analysis in those cases, but to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine has 
been adopted elsewhere. In federal appellate court, judges regularly 
point out results in other circuits—identifying the circuits that have 
ruled one way or another. The more circuits agreeing on a doctrine, the 
better—their persuasive weight is often largely authoritative. 
Schauer has proposed the term “optional authority” rather than 
“persuasive authority” as a term that better captures the nature of the 
authority a legal author includes at her discretion.59 The phrase 
persuasive authority is arguably a contradiction in terms—material that 
is cited for its persuasive power (its content) is not authority in the 
classic content-independent sense.60 The term “optional” does not 
purport to identify whether the authority chosen was chosen for its 
content, its status, or some combination of the two. It does not 
perpetuate the conventional wisdom that optional authority is chosen 
only for its persuasive power. For these reasons I adopt Schauer’s term 
for the remainder of this Article. 
Though optional authority is often introduced as authority used only 
for its substantive content, this view is contradicted by the guidance 
given for its application. The prevalence of status-related factors 
supports the view that optional authorities are often used in an 
authoritative way, despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary. 
There would be no reason to evaluate the weight of various categories 
of optional authority if such authorities were used only for their 
substantive content. Each authority would be assessed independently 
on substantive grounds, and status-related factors would be irrelevant. 
Disputes about the propriety of citing to any particular type of authority 
are always about the appropriate use of a source in authoritative ways. 
For example, in debates about the “citability” of unpublished opinions 
and foreign law, no one argues that either source is binding; the 
question is whether these sources may be used even as optional 
58 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1947. 
59 Id. at 1946.  
60 Id. at 1943. 
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authority.61 Arguably, if foreign law were used only for substantive 
reasons, there would be no reason to cite to it, and the controversy could 
be avoided altogether. 
Similarly, the controversy over unpublished opinions is not about 
whether such opinions are binding, but whether they are 
authoritative.62 Without an authoritative reason, the only reason to 
include an actual citation in the argument would be to attribute the idea 
to the source—to avoid plagiarism. In practice, citations seem to be 
included more often for their authoritative weight, not simply for the 
purpose of attribution. 
Although the authoritative reasons for choosing optional authority 
are sometimes recognized, the dissonance between those reasons and 
the prevalent narrative that persuasive authority is chosen for its 
substance typically is not.63 Such descriptions acknowledge the 
potential persuasive power of both the status and content of nonbinding 
sources, but do not note any distinction or tension between the two 
types of justification. 
The fixed boundaries of mandatory authority are a bit like the 
political boundaries of a state. On a map, the line between two states 
appears perfectly clear—conceptually the boundary is distinct. But on 
the ground, that line is often invisible. Every lawyer and law student 
understands the difference between binding and nonbinding authority. 
But on the ground—in the work of building legal arguments—the 
61 Ernest Young notes, “The crucial point is that, in this analysis, foreign practice carries 
weight that is independent of the underlying reasons for that practice. The Court thus 
chooses to treat foreign law as authoritative in Joseph Raz’s sense . . . .” Ernest A. Young, 
Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 156 (2005) (emphasis 
omitted). “The Court is not persuaded by new rationales, but rather by the mere fact that 
foreign jurisdictions take a particular view. It has not ‘learned’ anything from looking abroad 
other than to find out that others agree with what the Court already believed. It is deferring 
to numbers, not reasons.” Id. at 155. 
62 In discussing the merits of a federal rule barring citation of unpublished opinions, 
Judge Myron H. Bright observed that “while the argument made in an unpublished opinion 
may always be repeated in a brief, what the lawyers want is the imprint of three judges on 
that opinion.” Admin. Off. of the U.S. Ct., Advisory Comm. on App. Rules 15 (Apr. 13, 2004) 
(statement of Judge Myron H. Bright) (available at www.nonpublication.com/aphearing 
.htm). 
63 For example, according to one recent treatise on precedent authored by Bryan Garner 
and twelve notable judges, “Courts may perceive authority as being compelling (or not) 
depending on many factors.” The list of factors includes both substantive (“relevance and 
sound reasoning” and whether it is “founded on solid principles”) and authoritative (“the 
reputation of the author or issuing court” and “the extent to which [it] has been cited and 
followed”). GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 164 (2016). 
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distinction is much less clear. When optional authority is used for 
authoritative purposes, and mandatory authority is recognized as 
indeterminate in many cases, the difference between the two looks 
much less stark.64 Legal decisionmakers are not consulting binding 
sources for guidance and then filling in “gaps” only as they are 
substantively persuaded to do so—this picture is much too simplistic. 
Because optional authority often carries authoritative (content-
independent) weight, it is much more similar to mandatory authority 
than a binary, hierarchical model allows. Legal decisionmakers often 
appear to be consulting such sources in the same way they consult 
binding sources. Secondary sources, like jury instructions or 
restatements, are cited as authoritative evidence of what the law is, not 
for their substantive persuasive power. 
Whether optional authority should be used for authoritative reasons 
is beyond the scope of this Article. But optional authority is used 
regularly in an authoritative way, giving it a weight similar to that of 
mandatory authority. Thus, the weight of authority is not a simple 
binary concept but a more subtle and fluid notion.65 
1. Optional Judicial Opinions Vary Widely in Weight
The variation in weight is most developed in the realm of judicial
precedent; there has long been an array of customs addressing the 
weight of opinions in different circumstances, though the term weight 
is never quite defined. This is true for both binding and optional 
precedent. The hierarchy of authority does not distinguish among the 
subtle differences in weight that exist in practice despite the fact that 
they are regularly acknowledged: the model does not match reality. 
Most would agree that even vertical precedent is not uniformly 
weighted. “While many cases are technically binding, they can 
64 When optional authority is used authoritatively, Ernest Young questions whether it is 
any different from binding authority. Young, supra note 61, at 151 (“When a legal rule has 
force whether or not we agree with the reasons used to justify it, is that not the very definition 
of binding legal authority?”); former Judge Kozinski asserts, “Controlling authority has 
much in common with persuasive authority.” Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1172 (9th 
Cir. 2001). Chad Flanders has sought “to demonstrate that the difference between the respect 
owed to decisions with a merely persuasive authority turns out to be more a difference in 
degree than a difference in kind.” Flanders, supra note 11, at 59.  
65 Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West’s Federal Appendix: The Ground 
Shifts Under No Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 9, 12 (2002) (describing the 
“spectrum of precedent” as a “rich palette,” naming categories as binding, overrulable 
precedent, precedent or precedential value, persuasive value, and citable). 
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nonetheless carry greater or lesser authority . . . .”66 Most notably, 
some cases are categorized as “super-precedent,” a term “generally 
understood to refer to cases that are so entrenched in the law and the 
legal culture that they can never or should never be reconsidered or 
overruled.”67 Brown v. Board of Education is the quintessential 
example. Other factors affecting the weight of authority might include 
the age of the case, whether it took on a novel issue, or whether it has 
been adopted in other jurisdictions. “Leading cases” are also attributed 
a greater weight—“one[s] that first definitely settled an important rule 
or legal principle and ha[ve] since been consistently and frequently 
followed. Such cases are of the very highest authority.”68 Whether 
leading cases are different from super-precedent is unclear, but in both 
cases the terms reference the reputation of the opinion in the legal 
community. 
Horizontal precedent is, depending on the circumstances, the next 
step down from vertical precedent. As noted above, it can be binding 
depending on the jurisdiction. All federal circuit courts are, by rule, 
bound by prior decisions in their own circuit. In such cases, it is not 
clear that horizontal precedent is any different in weight from vertical 
precedent. But in some situations, horizontal precedent may be less 
binding than vertical. For example, it is commonly acknowledged that 
the weight of the Supreme Court’s own precedent is something less 
than fully binding. There is no definitive explanation of the measure of 
this weight—the Supreme Court Justices themselves do not agree on 
its value.69 The Supreme Court’s own precedent can only be said to 
weigh more than optional authority but less than mandatory authority. 
66 GARNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 156. 
67 Matthew E. K. Hall, Bringing Down Brown: Super Precedents, Myths of Rediscovery, 
and Retroactive Canonization of Brown v. Board of Education, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 655, 657 
(2010) (Citing to William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. ECON. 249, 251 (1976), as first using the term “super-
precedent.”). 
68 GARNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 173. 
69 For example, in a 1991 Supreme Court decision, in the majority opinion Justice 
Rehnquist noted that “when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, ‘this 
Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
827 (1991) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)). Justice Marshall 
strongly disagreed in his dissent, writing that “this Court has never departed from precedent 
without ‘special justification.’” Id. at 849 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. 
Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). In Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992), Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter signed the opinion which began with 
the words: “Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.” The Court crafted a four-
part “pragmatic” test to determine whether to overrule Roe v. Wade. Id. at 854. 
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In that realm, where a court has the option of declining to follow any 
authority, variance in weight is arguably more logical than in the 
vertical context.  
In the context of the Supreme Court, different standards of deference 
have long been recognized: scholars have identified at least three 
different categories of weight depending on the nature of the issue 
before the court. The Supreme Court is said to give less weight to prior 
constitutional decisions, because “in such cases ‘correction through 
legislative action is practically impossible.’”70 This “diminished 
standard of deference to constitutional decisions”71 did not arise until 
the twentieth century.72 Decisions regarding statutory interpretation, in 
contrast, are given the most weight, because if such a decision is 
incorrect the legislature can act to override it.73 Common law decisions 
are thought to fall in the middle of those two categories.74 The federal 
courts of appeals seem to generally follow these practices as well.75 
Another commonly recognized convention is a stronger 
presumption in favor of precedent that interprets property and contract 
rights based on reliance interests.76 Property and contract rights receive 
more weight on the “sliding stare decisis scale,”77 while procedural and 
evidentiary precedents are given less weight.78 Reliance is an important 
content-independent consideration: “An opinion that has in fact 
induced considerable reliance interests will often receive more respect 
than one that hasn’t.”79 
It is hard to know what it means for one binding source to have more 
weight than another, unless the difference in weight is simply a 
70 Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 
407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
71 Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to 
the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 704 (1999). 
72 Id. at 704, 720, 727 (1999) (noting that 1944 was the first majority opinion to adopt 
the Brandeis vision of diminished deference to constitutional precedent). 
73 Barrett, Stare Decisis, supra note 28, at 1030; see also WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE 
TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 128 (3d ed. 2014). 
74 Barrett, Precedent, supra note 30, at 1713; see also Lindquist & Cross, supra note 22, 
at 1162. 
75 Barrett, Precedent, supra note 30, at 1713. 
76 Lee, supra note 71, at 649–50; Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). 
77 Lee, supra note 71, at 687; GARNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 161. 
78 Lee, supra note 71, at 687. 
79 GARNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 161. 
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trumping rule to be applied when two sources conflict.80 This construct 
only seems to work in the realm of soft horizontal precedent, where 
decision makers can decide whether or not to overturn precedent. 
Casting authority as more or less binding authority in a vertical context 
is problematic because it gives discretion to a decision maker in 
circumstances where she is not supposed to have any. This is the 
unsurprising result of a system that does not acknowledge the 
complicated nature of difficult legal questions. 
Judicial opinions deemed nonbinding due to the rules of the 
hierarchy have authoritative value in many circumstances, such as 
when they contain longstanding common law principles.81 As is often 
noted, federal circuit courts pay close attention to, and are likely 
influenced by, the decisions of other circuits even though such 
decisions are not binding. For instance, a study by David Klein shows 
that in federal court decisions establishing new legal rules in unsettled 
areas of law, the previous nonbinding decision of another circuit is a 
significant determinant.82 A recent treatise on the law of judicial 
precedent tracks the customs suggesting a greater or lesser weight for 
more than a dozen categories of opinions, such as per curium decisions, 
pluralities, advisory opinions, and so on.83  
Advice for the use of optional authority commonly includes a set of 
criteria for determining the relative value of nonbinding judicial 
opinions,84 such as the identity of the court and the date of the decision. 
John Henry Merryman long ago identified a “factor of authority,” 
which gives higher regard for the decisions of some courts than for 
others.85 The level of the court and the identity of the judge are 
80 NEUMANN, supra note 26 (“Sources of law, both primary and secondary, are ranked 
so that in the event of inconsistencies, one can be chosen over another.”). 
81 “Even when a precedent is not binding (for it may not be a precedent of the higher 
court), it may be so deeply woven into the fabric of the law that its overruling would be 
unthinkable. (Holmes gave the example of the doctrine of consideration in contract law.)” 
POSNER, supra note 2, at 44. 
82 DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 137 
(2002) (In decisions that establish new legal rules in significant unsettled areas of antitrust, 
environmental, and search and seizure law Klein found that the decision of another circuit 
court on same issue was a significant determinant). Similarly, Chad Flanders provides three 
examples of what he calls “super persuasive” authority: (1) circuit courts citing other circuit 
courts; (2) state courts citing other state courts interpreting the same uniform act; and (3) 
state courts citing other state court common law decisions. Flanders, supra note 11, at 75). 
83 GARNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 155 passim.  
84 See, e.g., NEUMANN, supra note 26, at 88. 
85 Merryman, supra note 5, at 403. 
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frequently cited as significant factors in the supposed weight of an 
opinion.86 Other factors include whether the opinion was unanimous, 
the thoroughness of the opinion, and the expertise of the court making 
the decision.87 Charles Sullivan calls the ranking of nonbinding 
authority “graded persuasiveness”88: the common practice of judges 
and lawyers to rank nonmandatory judicial decisions “on a kind of 
sliding scale.”89 In their book about legal arguments, Bryan Garner and 
Justice Scalia cite status-related attributes which they say makes 
nonbinding precedent more persuasive.90 
Many others—including the authors of research and writing 
textbooks—offer these sorts of factors to help a legal author choose 
among optional sources, and more factors are based on the status of the 
source than its substantive content. For example, in his legal analysis 
text, Richard Neumann offers seven criteria for selecting primary 
persuasive authority,91 and four of them are related to status. Similarly, 
Linda Edwards offers a list of ten factors for selecting nonbinding 
judicial opinions, and at least seven of them are based on the status of 
the opinion rather than the substance of it.92 The factors are usually 
relevant only for judicial opinions, not other types of sources. 
86 See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 82; Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: 
A Critical History, 5 WISC. L. REV. 771, 779 (1988) (“[T]he opinions of more learned and 
esteemed judges carry more weight and have more authority as precedents . . . .”). 
87 Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1202; Dobbins, supra note 27, at 1462. 
88 Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1201. 
89 Id.  
90 “Among the precedents that are nongoverning, there is a hierarchy of persuasiveness 
that far too many advocates ignore. The most persuasive nongoverning case authorities are 
the dicta of governing courts (quote them, but be sure to identify them as dicta) and the 
holdings of governing courts in analogous cases. Next are the holdings of courts of appeals 
coordinate to the court of appeals whose law governs your case; next, the holdings of trial 
courts coordinate to your court; finally (and rarely worth pursuing), the holdings of courts 
inferior to your court and courts of other jurisdictions.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 23, 
at 53. 
91 NEUMANN, supra note 26, at 88–89 (The seven criteria are: (1) is the precedent on 
point? Or if not on point, would sound analogy make it useful anyway? (2) Quality of the 
precedent’s reasoning; (3) identity of the precedential court; (4) treatment of the precedent 
in other reported opinions; (5) clarity with which the holding is expressed; (6) when the 
precedent was decided; and (7) positions taken by a judge in precedential court (is the 
authority unanimous, respected dissent, influential judge?). 
92 EDWARDS, supra note 44, at 59–61 (Factors which affect precedential value are: (1) 
relative level of court; (2) date of opinion; (3) strength of the court’s reasoning; (4) 
subsequent treatment by other authorities; (5) whether court’s statements about your issue 
are part of holding or dictum; (6) how factually similar opinion is to the facts of the present 
situation; (7) the number of subscribing judges; (8) whether the opinion is published; (9) the 
reputation of the particular judge writing the case opinion; and (10) trends in the law). 
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The parts of judicial opinions deemed nonbinding often have 
authoritative weight as well. Most notably, dictum—consistently 
defined as never binding—has authoritative weight. Several scholars 
have noted an increasing tendency for lower courts to consider 
themselves bound by the dicta of superior courts.93 Less well-known 
than dicta but in the same category (parts of judicial precedent deemed 
nonbinding) are the parts of judicial opinions determining the 
appropriate interpretive methodology. Abbe Gluck has pointed out that 
in the Supreme Court and other federal courts, methodological 
decisions are not accorded the same degree of bindingness as other 
substantive parts of a judicial opinion: “[T]he legal status of 
methodology itself—whether it is ‘law’ or something ‘less’ or 
‘different’—remains entirely unresolved.”94 There is no agreement as 
to whether there should be stare decisis for principles of statutory 
construction, but as Gluck demonstrates, the parts of an opinion 
choosing a methodology of interpretation do not carry the same weight 
as substantive rules.95 Secondary rules, which are rules about how to 
interpret rules, seem to be entitled to less weight than first-order rules.96 
Again, the hierarchy gives no hint of this distinction, perhaps because 
it presupposes a simplistic syllogistic methodology. Once this 
methodology is called into question, the choice of sources is as well. 
The complicated array of weights in judicial opinions alone belies 
the simplistic binary vision of authority that predominates in the 
profession. 
93 See David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower 
Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2021 (2013) (“[L]ower courts 
hardly ever refuse to follow a statement from a higher court because it is dictum.”). Judge 
Pierre Leval writes that “[t]he distinction between dictum and holding is more and more 
frequently disregarded.” Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About 
Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1250 (2006); see also Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1154 (“The 
elevation of dictum toward quasi-binding status, coupled with the elevation of vacated 
opinions to persuasive power has tended towards a kind of federal ‘common law’ that 
increasingly mirrors the legislative approach.”). Along the same lines, vacated and 
unpublished opinions can have some authoritative weight. Sullivan has noted that judges are 
citing even vacated opinions, noting that such vacated authority might be “‘only’ persuasive, 
but that means it is beginning to emerge as one of the sources which a judge attuned to the 
norms of the profession may, and perhaps should, take into account.” Id. at 1206. 
94 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1756 
(2010) [hereinafter Gluck, States as Laboratories]. 
95 Id.  
96 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–95 (3d ed. 2012). 
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2. The Spectrum of Weight Includes Sources Other Than Case Law
Indeed, the spectrum of weight continues well beyond the hierarchy
of judicial opinions, yet receives very little attention. Some have 
attempted to impose a kind of extended hierarchy on those sources. 
Chad Flanders asserts that “[t]here is, in fact, a hierarchy of persuasive 
authority,”97 and that nonbinding court decisions have more weight 
than law review articles or treatises.98 Others agree—secondary 
authority is generally depicted as having less weight than primary 
authority,99 though what that weight might be has barely been 
considered. Because the authoritative weight of optional authority is 
not largely acknowledged, there is little exploration of its value. 
Many “never binding” sources such as the Federalist Papers, 
legislative history, dictionaries, and canons of interpretation100 are all 
used in classic authoritative ways—for their status, not their 
substantive content. For example, canons of interpretation, a long-
accepted part of statutory interpretation, have no particular place on the 
hierarchy of authority but are used for their status. As highlighted by 
Gluck, such canons are often referred to simply as “rules of thumb;” 
their legal status is ambiguous.101 Canons of construction can be found 
in judicial opinions, but at least in federal court, they are not typically 
deemed binding in the same way as substantive law. In some state 
courts, canons of interpretation are made binding by statute, 
demonstrating that  there is an open question even as to who or which 
97 Flanders, supra note 11, at 58. 
98 Id. 
99 HELENE S. SHAPO, MARILYN R. WALTER & ELIZABETH FAJANS, WRITING AND 
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 282 (5th ed. 2008) (“Secondary materials are generally of less 
weight than primary persuasive authorities.”). 
100 In the world of statutory interpretation, even amicus briefs filed by the Solicitor 
General on matters of statutory interpretation have been described as “quasi-authoritative 
on points of fact or even law.” William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum 
of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron 
to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1112 (2008). 
101 Abbe Gluck has recently drawn attention to the unclear status of these ubiquitous 
canons:  
At a minimum, and regardless of how the stare decisis question is resolved, canons 
must have some legal status. If they aren’t precedent or “law,” what are they? It is 
difficult to think of any other rules that do so much work in judicial opinions whose 
legal status remains so ambiguous.  
Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory 
Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 615 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck, 30 Years of 
Chevron]. 
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institution should decide on interpretive methodology.102 The weight 
of these sources varies with context. 
Similarly, agency interpretations—famously governed by 
Chevron103 and its progeny—are typically granted significant 
authoritative weight. Determining the weight of agency interpretations 
in any particular circumstance—the degree of deference accorded such 
interpretations by a court—is a complicated subject that cannot be fully 
addressed here. (Even Chevron itself is not always treated as fully 
binding,104 similarly to other methodological opinions, as Gluck has 
pointed out.) But the role of agencies cannot be ignored in any 
comprehensive accounting of legal authority. The varying degrees of 
deference courts give to agency interpretations—what some have 
called a “continuum of deference”105—are just another way of 
describing the authoritative weight of agency decisions on the larger 
scale of authority. 
Pattern jury instructions are another source of authority with clear 
authoritative weight, but their weight seems to vary from one 
jurisdiction to another,106 and it is difficult to find any description of 
their role. By authoritative weight, I refer to their weight as 
102 Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 94. 
103 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“Such legislative 
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.”). 
104 Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: 
An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1727, 1808 (2010) (“Although Justices sometimes seem to treat Chevron as binding 
as a matter of stare decisis (illustrated by Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in City of 
Jackson), Chevron is more typically treated like a canon of construction (illustrated by 
Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court in City of Jackson, by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
opinion for the Court in Solid Waste, and probably by Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in 
Rapanos).”).  
105 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 100, at 1090. 
106 “A lawyer engaged in litigation should know the weight of authority given jury 
instructions in his or her state.” Am. Inst. of Law Libraries’ Research Instruction Caucus, 
Core Legal Research Competencies: A Compendium of Skills and Values as Defined in the 
ABA’s McCrate Report 107 (Ellen M. Callinan ed., July 1997) [hereinafter Core Legal 
Research Competencies]; see also State v. Watkins, 820 N.W.2d 264, 268 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2012), aff’d on other grounds, 840 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 2013) (quoting State v. Kelley, 734 
N.W.2d 689, 695 (Minn. App. 2007) (“[T]he jury instruction guides are ‘not precedential or 
binding.’”); United States v. Carter, 776 F.3d 1309, 1324 (11th Cir. 2015) (“However, this 
Circuit’s pattern instructions, while a valuable resource, are not binding law.”). 
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authoritative statements of what the law is, which is how they are 
frequently cited by courts in judicial opinions.107 
Even traditional secondary authority can be virtually mandatory—
to fail to cite to particular sources is to ignore authority the court is sure 
to rely on. Sources of nonbinding authority may be virtually mandatory 
in some circumstances because they carry so much authoritative 
weight, as Schauer has observed.108 Many fields of law have a 
particular treatise that is almost always consulted and relied upon109: 
the Witkin treatises in California are an oft-cited example.110 
According to the Core Legal Research Competencies prepared by the 
American Institute of Law Libraries, these types of local treatises are 
“authoritative texts,”111 though they are undoubtedly only optional 
authority. State courts frequently cite state practice treatises for what 
appears to be their authoritative status.112 For those in federal litigation 
practice, Moore’s Federal Practice113 and Wright & Miller’s Federal 
Practice and Procedure treatises have a similar status.114 
Secondary authorities are themselves sometimes informally ranked 
in an effort to give them a place relative to the hierarchy of authority.115 
107 See, e.g., Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Shirley, 288 P.3d 390, 398 (Wash. App. 2012) 
(citing jury instructions for definition of proximate cause). 
108 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1958 (“For example, it is virtually impossible to 
argue or decide an evidence case in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court without 
making reference to Liacos’s Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence or its successor.”). 
109 See id. (pointing out other examples like the Massachusetts court following particular 
evidence treatise); Core Legal Research Competencies, supra note 106, at 104.  
110 Core Legal Research Competencies, supra note 106; FREDERICK SCHAUER, 
THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 71 (2009) (using example of Loss and Seligman’s Securities 
Regulation treatise as a source of expertise). 
111 Core Legal Research Competencies, supra note 106, at 104. 
112 See, e.g., Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393, 398 (Colo. 2010) (“If 
an employee is entitled to more than the maximum aggregate lump sum available, her 
remaining bi-weekly payment is reduced by the amount of the lump sum payment spread 
out over the remainder of her life expectancy.”) (citing 17 Douglas R. Phillips & Susan D. 
Phillips, Colorado Practice Series: Colorado Workers’ Compensation Practice and 
Procedure § 6.61 at 335 (2d ed. 2005)). 
113 DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, GREGORY P. JOSEPH, GEORGENE M. VAIRO, SOL 
SCHREIBER & CHILTON DAVIS VARNER, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE (3rd ed. 1997) 
(originally written by Professor James William Moore in 1938). 
114 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
(1980–2018). 
115 See, e.g., SHAPO, ET AL., supra note 99 (“Secondary materials are generally of less 
weight than primary persuasive authorities.”); NEUMANN, supra note 26, at 90 (explaining 
legal encyclopedias, legal dictionaries and American Law Reports (ALR) articles should be 
used “only as a last resort”). 
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Nonlegal sources, discussed further below, are thought to be at the 
bottom of the hierarchy,116 perhaps off the grid altogether.117 Such 
sources, including empirical studies from other disciplines, are 
regularly cited in support of a legal argument and frequently referred 
to as “authority” simply by virtue of being cited in support of a legal 
argument. But they are neither law, nor evidence of law, and as such 
fall into an entirely different category. Such nonlegal sources may have 
little authoritative (content-independent) value; they appear to be cited 
primarily for their substantive content. 
These variations in weight do not fit a hierarchical structure, a 
structure that not only sets permanently fixed weights but suggests a 
precision in weight that just does not exist in practice. While all of these 
subtleties in weight have been acknowledged in various settings, there 
is no comprehensive view—and no recognition that the task of creating 
a complete hierarchical taxonomy of authority may be inherently 
flawed. An extensive, precise hierarchy is attractive but ultimately 
misleading. Authority can never be satisfactorily taxonomized in a 
fixed manner because its use is not only context dependent but 
constantly evolving.  
B. Acceptable Sources of Authority Are Constantly Evolving
The traditional view of legal authority masks another one of its 
essential features: its dynamic nature. In recent years, there have been 
many empirical studies of citation practices, and if there is one common 
theme among these studies, it is that citation is not a static practice.118 
A heavy emphasis on mandatory sources presents a stagnant picture of 
authority because sources on the hierarchy remain the same, as do their 
designated weights in relation to one another. The traditional view of 
authority defines authority as a list of sources, not as an active practice. 
116 Margolis, supra note 16, at 919. 
117 Schauer & Wise, Delegalization, supra note 3 (“[A]uthorities outside of the 
traditional legal canon [are] traditionally understood to be at or even below the bottom of 
the hierarchy of acceptable authority.”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 23, at 127 
(“Don’t expect the court, or even the law clerks, to read your secondary authority; they will 
at most check to see that it supports the point you make. They will therefore be persuaded 
not by the reasoning of your secondary authority but only by the fact that its author agrees 
with you. And the force of the persuasion will vary directly with the prominence of the 
author. Thus, except as a convenient way to refer the court to a compendium of cases, it’s 
not much help to bring to the court’s attention the fact that a student law-review note is on 
your side. Use it only when you have nothing else.”). 
118 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1960. (“At least in American courts, citation 
practice is now undergoing rapid change . . . .”) 
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Optional authority practices can and do change because, unlike the 
realm of mandatory authority, there are no formal rules limiting the 
optional sources that can be cited in support of a legal argument. When 
a lawyer cites to mandatory authority in a brief, the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct require the lawyer to “disclose to the tribunal 
legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be 
directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel.”119 There is no parallel requirement or even 
convention for optional authority.120 Conventions of legal citation do 
not require comprehensive citation—a favorable case in one 
jurisdiction may be cited while a raft of opposing cases from other 
jurisdictions need not be mentioned at all.121 The choice of optional 
authority is entirely up to the author and thus entirely a matter of 
strategy. It remains, surprisingly, almost entirely unexplained as a 
general matter.122 
Reliance on optional authority is often referred to simply as a 
“norm,” and the legal community informally determines whether a 
source is acceptable. Sources of authority can become more or less 
valuable, and sources which once were not recognized as having any 
weight at all can become authoritative. Schauer explains that, “in 
reality, the status of a source as an authority is the product of an 
informal, evolving, and scalar process by which some sources become 
progressively more and more authoritative as they are increasingly used 
and accepted.”123 At one point in history, it was only acceptable to cite 
dead treatise authors, not those who were still living.124 Although it 
would have once been unthinkable to cite to an empirical study, doing 
so is now common. The authoritative weight of legislative history 
119 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
120 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1950.  
121 Consider Llewellyn’s infamous observation about canons of construction: Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About 
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) (“[T]o make any canon 
take hold in a particular instance, the construction contended must be sold, essentially, by 
means other than the use of the canon . . . .”). Or, as Duncan Kennedy long ago observed, 
“In a typical legal argument, policies are elaborated and strongly asserted without regard to 
their matched pairs.” Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical 
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 534 (1986).  
122 Though the value of specific types of optional authority are explored in great depth 
in the fields of statutory and constitutional interpretation. 
123 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1956–57; see also Flanders, supra note 11, at 63. 
(“Not anything and everything is cited as persuasive authority.”). 
124 Schauer & Wise, Legal Positivism, supra note 52, at 1088–89. 
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fluctuates depending on the judge, the court, and the era. The same is 
true of dicta, of treatises, and of foreign law. 
According to Schauer, a judge is “permitted by the applicable 
professional norms” to use certain optional authorities “in a way that 
she is not permitted, for fear of criticism and professional 
embarrassment if nothing else, to provide citations to astrology, private 
conversations with her brother, articles in the National Enquirer, and 
(slightly more controversially) the Bible.”125 Any active debates about 
“what the law is” fall within the realm of optional authority, with its 
fluid boundaries.126 
While optional authority could certainly be limited by custom, limits 
are not the norm; the trend is clearly moving in the opposite direction. 
In neither of the two debates mentioned above (whether foreign law or 
unpublished cases should be recognized as valid legal sources) have 
opponents of any particular class of authority succeeded in limiting its 
use. As (then federal judge) Justice John Roberts observed during the 
debate about citation to unpublished authority:  
Traditionally I think in our adversary system we allow disputes 
about the value of citable materials to be resolved by the lawyers in 
the exercise of their professional judgment in the interest of their 
client and let the judges decide whether we think that’s worth 
anything, whether it’s an opinion from another circuit, a district court 
opinion, a student comment in a law review.127  
That debate led to the enactment of Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 32.1, which prevents federal courts from prohibiting or 
restricting citation of unpublished opinions.128 The debate about 
whether to limit citation seems to have waned, perhaps in accordance 
125 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1947 (emphasis omitted). 
126 Id. at n.54.  
127 Admin. Off. of the U.S. Ct., Advisory Comm. on App. Rules 53–54 (Apr. 13, 2004) 
(statement of Justice (then Circuit Judge) John G. Roberts) (available at http://www. 
nonpublication.com/aphearing.htm) (“You know, my experience over the last 10 months, I 
think I’ve seen non—whatever we call them—nonprecedential memoranda, whatever, 
probably twice. Two different times I’ve seen that cited, even though it’s freely citable in 
our circuit, because the lawyers know the judges aren’t terribly impressed by it. On the other 
hand, as a lawyer I’ve had situations where that is the exact case. It’s a year ago. Maybe two 
of the judges are on the same panel. However basic the proposition, in my professional 
judgment this is what I want that court to know on my client’s behalf and I found 
it frustrating to have a rule saying you can’t do that.”). 
128 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 provides: “A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of 
federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: (i) 
designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or 
the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.” 
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with a societal trend toward greater access to information. Even Twitter 
may now constitute an acceptable source of authority.129 A 
mainstream, nonlegal newspaper, USA Today, carried a headline in 
November of 2017 proclaiming that “@realDonaldTrump’s tweets 
often carry legal weight.”130 
While lawyers and judges may once have relied on finite body of 
legal information with strictly defined borders, that is no longer the 
case.131 But the current dominant primary/secondary distinction, 
without more, offers no means of differentiating between sources as 
disparate as empirical social science studies and legislative history. In 
the traditional hierarchy of authority, all nonprimary authority falls 
129 See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 773 n.14 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom. 
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017), vacated, 874 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017) (The Ninth Circuit 
cited the President’s Twitter Account: “Indeed, the President recently confirmed his 
assessment that it is the ‘countries’ that are inherently dangerous, rather than the 180 million 
individual nationals of those countries who are barred from entry under the President’s 
‘travel ban.’ See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2017, 6:20 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/871899511525961728 (‘That’s right, we need 
a TRAVEL BAN for certain DANGEROUS countries, not some politically correct term that 
won’t help us protect our people!’).”) (emphasis in original). The court also cited Elizabeth 
Landers, White House: Trump’s Tweets are ‘Official Statements’, CNN (June 6, 2017, 4:37 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/politics/trump-tweets-official-statements/, reporting 
the White House Press Secretary’s confirmation that the President’s tweets are “considered 
official statements by the President of the United States.” The court took “judicial notice of 
President Trump’s statement as the veracity of [the] statement can be accurately and readily 
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Hawaii, 859 
F.3d at 773 n.14. (internal quotation omitted). But see Note, Tweets on Transgender Military
Members, 131 HARV. L. REV. 934 (2018) (explaining the President’s tweets lack “legal
status”).
130 Gregory Korte, Trump and the Twitter Presidency: @realDonaldTrump’s Tweets 
Often Carry Legal Weight, USA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2017, 10:55 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/11/08/trump-and-twitter-presidency-
realdonaldtrumps-tweets-often-carry-legal-weight/815980001/; see also Marcia Coyle, 
Trump’s Tweets Are ‘Authority’ in Advocates’ New Travel Ban Filings, THE NAT’L L.J. 
(June 12, 2017, 12:02 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/ 
1202789419920?cmp=share_twitter (“In what may be a first at the U.S. Supreme Court, 
President Donald Trump’s Twitter account was identified Monday as an ‘authority’ along 
with the cases, law review articles and news citations that lawyers typically use to bolster 
their arguments.”). 
131 Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1673, 1691 (2000) (explaining in 1899 authority issues were simple because 
the world of authority was much more restricted) [hereinafter Berring, Cognitive Authority]; 
see also Schauer & Wise, Legal Positivism, supra note 52, at 1080; Schauer & Wise, 
Delegalization, supra note 3, at 514 (“In many respects legal decision making is highly 
information dependent and was traditionally dependent on a comparatively small universe 
of legal information, a universe whose boundaries were effectively established, widely 
understood, and efficiently patrolled.”). 
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within one largely undifferentiated category called secondary 
authority, reflecting its original perceived insignificance (the word 
secondary is commonly defined as lesser or inferior).132 This single, 
nebulous category obscures even the most obvious developments in 
authority, providing no framework for their discussion. 
A marked increase in the use of nonlegal sources and an entire 
schema of authority devoted to the interpretation of statutes and 
regulations are two examples of the important ways that the use of legal 
authority has changed, demanding a deeper look at the current practice 
of deploying legal authority. 
1. Changes in Access and the Use of Nonlegal Information
Dramatic improvement in access to information is one of the reasons
for a new, more nuanced view of authority. The impact of this change 
can hardly be overstated. At a minimum, much more information is 
now reliably available to every lawyer and judge, and that has clearly 
played an important role in the recent changes to citation practice.133 
Any such changes are not explicitly recognized by the hierarchy of 
authority. Instead, the realm of nonbinding sources (essentially off the 
grid) just continues to grow. 
The evolution of sources is multifaceted—it is not limited to the 
addition of new categories of sources. With changes in technology, 
optional authority has gained many of the attributes of mandatory 
authority. A rule of law system requires that law be “accessible and so 
far as possible intelligible, clear, and predictable.”134 Optional 
132 Secondary, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed., available at www.oed.com) 
(“Belonging to the second class in respect of dignity or importance; entitled to consideration 
only in the second place. Also, and usually, in less precise sense: Not in the first class; not 
chief or principal; of minor importance, subordinate.”). 
133 See, e.g., Berring, Cognitive Authority, supra note 131; Schauer & Wise, Legal 
Positivism, supra note 52, at 1105; Schauer & Wise, Delegalization, supra note 3, at 497; 
Michael Whiteman, The Death of Twentieth-Century Authority, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 27 (2010); ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF LAW (1989); Richard B. Cappalli, Bringing Internet Information to 
Court: Of “Legislative Facts,” 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 99, 123 (2002) (“Not long ago, lawyers 
would have lacked the time, resources and capacity to generate extra-legal studies and 
reports supporting their legal argumentation.”). The E-Government Act of 2002 requires 
each circuit to establish and maintain a website with all written opinions. Pub. L. No. 107-
347 (Dec. 17, 2002).  
134 TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 37 (2010); see also Jeremy Waldron, Stare 
Decisis and the Rule of Law, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (The rule of law requires “that 
the laws be the same for all and that they be accessible to the people in a clear, public, stable, 
and prospective form.”). 
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authority is becoming more like mandatory authority in these very 
ways. When opinions were rarely published and difficult to access, the 
most important sources of law were treatises that restated the law.135 
The legal system now has the opposite problem—a vast and ever-
growing number of reliably accessible judicial opinions, and a vast 
number of other easily accessible sources of information.136 The sheer 
volume of sources now available is one of the likely reasons for a recent 
movement to develop a positive legal methodology—a way to figure 
out what the law is.137 
The change in form from print to digital has arguably also affected 
the way attorneys perceive and engage with the law.138 These changes 
have made mandatory and optional sources look more similar.139 
Frederick Schauer and Virginia Wise, among numerous others, have 
tracked and analyzed the increase in use of “nonlegal” authority,140 and 
135 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001). 
136 Id. at 1174 (“The very existence of the binding authority principle is not inevitable.”) 
137 See, e.g., William Baude, Adam S. Chilton & Anup Malani, A Call for Developing a 
Field of Positive Legal Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
138 More than twenty-five years ago, Katsch argued that “[t]he change in the means of 
access to legal materials will ultimately affect how law is perceived by lawyers and by others 
who may have an interest in such materials. Print supported a standardized set of categories, 
and every case was placed into one or more categories. The internal organization of legal 
materials need no longer conform to such a system. If law cannot be expected to possess the 
same internal organization in the future, neither can it expect its external boundaries to 
remain as fixed as they are today. The question of what is law, which even today is often a 
matter of controversy, or the issue of who is entitled to dispense ‘legal’ information will 
become even more difficult in the future.” M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 223 (1989). 
139 “These differences in the research process mean that, as a general matter, electronic 
researchers do not encounter and interpret individual cases through the lens of key system 
information (key topics/numbers, digest blurbs) to the same extent as print researchers.” 
Katrina Fischer Kuh, Electronically Manufactured Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 223, 247 
(2008). As a result, there is “greater divergence with respect to case texts reviewed . . . . 
[S]earches that electronic researchers run are highly individualized.” Id. at 249. Others argue
that “changes in legal publishing and electronic search technologies are making it
increasingly difficult for the current generation of legal researchers to distinguish easily
between types of authority and their relative weight.” Margolis, supra note 16, at 922.
Margolis argues that “[t]he external clues which reinforce notions of authority in the print-
based world do not exist in the online world. The technology driven changes do more than
change the way we access legal materials. Indeed, they make it increasingly difficult to
determine just what counts as ‘law’ at all.” Id. at 923.
140 Schauer & Wise, Delegalization, supra note 3; see also, Margolis, supra note 16, at 
923; Bezalel Stern, Nonlegal Citations and the Failure of Law: A Case Study of the Supreme 
Court 2010-11 Term, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 79, 89 (2013).  
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more than fifteen years ago questioned whether the distinction between 
legal and nonlegal authority is itself breaking down.141  
The use of nonlegal sources—social science authorities in 
particular—is perhaps the most conspicuous example of a changing 
citation practice. Citation to social science authorities was once 
nonexistent, but the practice has now become entirely 
commonplace.142 The marked increase in citation of nonlegal sources 
in the last thirty years143 is a phenomenon that has received a great deal 
of attention.144 One study notes that “virtually every discipline, 
141 Schauer & Wise, Delegalization, supra note 3, at 515 (“[D]oes the breakdown of the 
line between the legal and the nonlegal with respect to information presage a breakdown in 
the line between the legal and the nonlegal with respect to law itself?”); Berring, Cognitive 
Authority, supra note 131, at 1675 (“Legal information is transforming from a stable 
universe of settled sources into a free-for-all of competing authority. . . . The way authority 
is used has changed; the way authority is defined is changing.”). Not all agree that 
technology has changed everything; Susan Nevelow Mart recently pointed out that “the 
nineteenth-century worldview of the legal system” has been incorporated into the algorithms 
of modern search engines, through Westlaw’s Key Numbers system and Lexis Advance’s 
Topics. Susan Nevelow Mart, The Algorithm as a Human Artifact: Implications for Legal 
[Re]Search, 109 LAW LIBR. J. 387, 419 (2017). 
142 Berring, Cognitive Authority, supra note 131, at 1688; but see Frederick Schauer, 
The Decline of “The Record”: A Comment on Posner, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 51, 55 n.25 (2013) 
[hereinafter Schauer, The Decline of the Record] (“[T]he purpose for which Brandeis used 
non-legal information and sources was in fact quite limited, and far more limited than has 
subsequently been appreciated.”). 
143 Schauer & Wise, Delegalization, supra note 3 (“Since 1990, the Supreme Court’s 
citation of nonlegal sources has increased dramatically, even as the number of citations has 
remained relatively constant, the number of clerks for the justices has remained constant, 
and the number of pages of opinions produced by the Court has decreased. Moreover, the 
same phenomenon of increased citation to nonlegal materials is seen in state courts and 
lower federal courts as well, although the absolute numbers are lower and the trend is 
slower.”). 
144 See, e.g., id. (discussing the trend); Margolis, supra note 16, at 922; Michael 
Whiteman, The Death of Twentieth-Century Authority, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 27 
(2010); Stern, supra note 140. For example, a study of secondary citations per majority 
opinion in the Supreme Court shows that secondary citations have increased from .5 per 
majority opinion in 1930, to 3.5 in 1960, to 5.5 in the 1996–97 term. William H. Manz, 
Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 
267, 297 (2002). Another study of Supreme Court citations shows a dramatic increase in the 
use of dictionaries from 1989–98, and an increase in citations to The Federalist and to 
various newspapers. John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S. 
Supreme Court Opinions, 94 LAW LIB. J. 427, 431–32 (2002); see also Note, Looking it Up: 
Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994). And, for 
example, in a study comparing the use of interpretive resources by Supreme Court Justices 
in workplace law cases, the Burger Court (1969–1985) relied on dictionaries in 1.4% of the 
cases, while the Rehnquist Court (1986–2002) relied on dictionaries in 6% of the cases. 
Conversely, the use of legislative history in workplace law cases decreased from 46.6% in 
the Burger Court era to 27.7% in the Rehnquist era. Use of language canons increased from 
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scientific or not, has become fair game for citation.”145 
Introductory explanations of authority in law do not typically 
include nonlegal authority because they end with traditional legal 
secondary sources. But scholars have long recognized the use of 
nonlegal sources in actual practice. More than thirty years ago, John 
Monahan and Laurens Walker tracked the Supreme Court’s perception 
of nonlegal authority, beginning with Muller v. Oregon,146 the case in 
which Louis Brandeis prepared his famous Brandeis Brief for the state. 
Monahan and Walker explain “After referring to the social science 
materials, the Court stated that although they ‘may not be, technically 
speaking, authorities,’ they would nonetheless receive ‘judicial 
cognizance.’”147 But by the time of Brown v. Board of Education,148 
“the Court referred to the social science studies that supported the 
district court’s finding that segregated public education harmed black 
children as ‘modern authority.’”149 
The use of such information—commonly referred to as “legislative 
facts” (as opposed to adjudicative facts)150—has generated a great deal 
of scholarly discussion. Defining “legislative facts” as “generalized 
facts about the world that are not limited to any specific case,”151 
Allison Orr Larsen documents an increase in empiricism152 in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, noting that “whatever the reason, the Court’s factual 
statements about the world are now commonly accompanied by 
12% to 23.4% and use of substantive canons from 8.3% to 15.6%. James J. Brudney & 
Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 30 (2005).   
145 Hasko, supra note 144, at 442 (noting the increase in use of scientific studies in 
federal courts noted in 1990 Federal Courts Study Committee). 
146 Monahan & Walker, supra note 36, at 480–81 (discussing Muller v. Oregon, 208 
U.S. 412 (1908)). 
147 Id. at 481 (“Further in the opinion, the Court clearly returned to the classical 
perspective and referred to the materials as presenting a question of fact.”). 
148 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
149 Monahan & Walker, supra note 36, at 483. Monahan and Walker argued that “courts 
should treat social science research relevant to creating a rule of law as a source of authority 
rather than as a source of facts.” They proposed that “courts treat social science research as 
they would legal precedent under the common law.” Id. at 488. 
150 The first use of this term is attributed to Kenneth Culp Davis in An Approach to 
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 404 (1942). 
151 Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble With Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1759 
(2014) [hereinafter Larsen, Trouble]. 
152 Id. at 1777. 
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nonlegal authorities.”153 Although a rich body of scholarship explores 
the regular use of legislative facts in judicial decision making, such 
sources have no place in the standard vocabulary of legal authority: the 
legal status of such sources remains unclear.154 Currently, social-
science-related information is just another part of the vast realm of 
nonbinding authority. 
Legal authors are generally not well equipped to evaluate the 
authoritative value (or substantive merits) of sources in other fields, 
and it is not at all clear that the citation of such sources follows any sort 
of meaningful guidelines. Schauer has raised concerns about the fact 
that appellate judges are increasingly conducting their own factual 
research.155 Appellate judges are distinguishing nonlegal material cited 
by parties in their briefs, which the other side can rebut, from material 
found independently by the judge and incorporated into an opinion, 
without providing an opportunity for the parties to respond. On the 
other side, former Federal Judge Richard Posner has argued that factual 
complexity has grown (scientific and technological complexity as well 
as financial and other commercial practices) and that judges should be 
“relying more than they do on facts established to a reasonable degree 
of certainty by science, including the social sciences, and technology, 
including statistical tools for marshaling and analyzing evidence.”156 
The hierarchy of authority assumes a limited set of sources and 
provides a built-in valuation for each one. For sources not in the 
hierarchy, such as social science papers, legal authors have no 
established way to evaluate their value. 
For the purpose of creating a better model of authority, this shift to 
nonlegal sources is particularly significant because their characteristics 
are so different from that of traditional legal authority. Desire for 
apparent objectivity increases the value of any source other than the 
153 Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 78 (2013) 
[hereinafter Larsen, Factual Precedents]; see also Larsen, Trouble, supra note 151 at 1803. 
(“As the Supreme Court shrinks the number of cases it agrees to hear every year, there is an 
increased focus on generalized facts as opposed to case-specific and record-specific ones.”); 
Wes Daniels, “Far Beyond the Law Reports”: Secondary Source Citations in United States 
Supreme Court Opinions October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 LAW. LIBR. J. 1 (1983). 
154 Richard B. Cappalli, Bringing Internet Information to Court: Of “Legislative Facts,” 
75 TEMP. L. REV. 99, 100 (2002). 
155 Schauer, The Decline of The Record, supra note 142. 
156 RICHARD POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 319, 
292 (2016) [hereinafter POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS]. Posner argues that judges need help 
finding such evidence, citing Schauer’s term “informationally disabled” to describe judges. 
Id. at 159. 
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decision maker herself and appears to drive the citation of just about 
anything, including social science studies. But the legal profession does 
not hold legal authors to any standards at all for quality or impartiality 
of sources. The custom is to cite to sources, and the quality of sources 
was not in question when a legal author could really draw only from a 
limited pool of vetted legal sources. Now, that pool has expanded to 
include virtually anything, without any corresponding system of 
scrutiny. Such a system is not a scientific model of evidence; the only 
guard against bias seems to be the adversarial design of the judicial 
system. 
2. The Rise of Enacted Law and Importance of Interpretive Sources
A second significant development in the legal system remains
seemingly unacknowledged by the standard hierarchy of authority—
the replacement of much of the common law with statutory and 
administrative regimes. This, in turn, has led to the expansion of entire 
scholarly fields focused on statutory and regulatory interpretation. The 
act of interpreting a primary rule is an act that requires external sources 
beyond the rule itself (even if only the interpreter herself, as “words do 
not interpret themselves.”157 But the traditional model of authority 
separates law from not law, and in a formalist legal world, such not law 
sources are of little significance. Thus, all sources used to interpret the 
law simply fall into the undifferentiated secondary category. In short, 
the conventional, juriscentric, hierarchy of authority, focused almost 
entirely on the identification of binding rules, mostly ignores the 
interpretation of those rules. 
Given the prevalence of interpretation in the modern legal world, the 
omission of interpretive authority is problematic, to say the least. As is 
generally acknowledged, in the first half of the twentieth century the 
“greater part of substantive law was recast in statutory form,”158 and 
we are now in the Age of Statutes, “an era in which federally made 
statutory law dominates the legal landscape and the primary role of 
federal courts is to interpret it.”159 Though not reflected by the 
hierarchy of authority, scholars have long been exploring the 
157 FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 35 
(2009). 
158 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 86 (2d ed. 2014). 
159 Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the 
Ages of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 755 (2013) (“Statutory interpretation cases 
dominate the federal docket.”). 
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consequences of an increasingly legislative legal universe.160 The 
fields of constitutional interpretation and statutory interpretation are 
vast; in both fields scholars have developed—and the conversation is 
far from over—complex interpretive theories that rely on many 
nonbinding sources, such as legislative history, canons of construction, 
documents evidencing the drafters’ intent, dictionaries, and so on. 
The Age of Statutes and the rise of the administrative state have 
made interpretation a primary task of many decision makers, but most 
of the sources used to resolve interpretive disputes do not appear in the 
hierarchy of authority, except as part of the undifferentiated realm of 
nonbinding sources. For example, introductory lists of authority 
typically omit legislative history, even though judges and lawyers 
commonly rely on it. It is not even clear whether legislative history is 
primary or secondary; many texts do not label it one way or another. 
One research text calls it “a unique form of legal authority,”161 another 
lists it under “primary sources of law,”162 and some refer to it as 
“secondary authority,”163 though it does not appear to ever be included 
in introductory lists of secondary authority. In the historical sense, 
legislative history is a primary source—it is “based on firsthand 
experience.”164 And it is not secondary to primary legal authority in the 
traditional sense (it does not compile or summarize primary sources), 
which may explain its absence from secondary authority lists. 
Traditional introductory descriptions of authority pay little attention 
to the allocation of interpretive power among institutions, despite the 
increasing significance of statutory regimes and the administrative 
state.165 Arguably, the formalist hierarchy of authority significantly 
160 Abbe Gluck has analyzed in depth what she calls “a resounding shift in the center of 
law’s gravity away from judge-made law toward statutes and their primary administrators.” 
Gluck, 30 Years of Chevron, supra note 101, at 631. 
161 KUNZ, ET AL., supra note 54, at 279 (“The materials created during the legislative 
process are generated by a government body while creating primary authority—a statute—
but they are subordinate to the statute itself.”); cf. AMY SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH 
199 (3d ed. 2006) (“In deciding cases, judges must determine what the legislature intended 
when it passed the statute.”).  
162 MARK K. OSBECK, IMPECCABLE RESEARCH: A CONCISE GUIDE TO MASTERING 
LEGAL RESEARCH SKILLS 125 (2010). 
163 BARKAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 10. 
164 See Primary, Secondary & Tertiary Sources Defined, USC LIBR. RES. GUIDES (last 
updated Aug. 8, 2018, 1:58 PM), http://libguides.usc.edu/primarysources/home (listing 
examples of primary sources, including “interview and speech transcripts . . . oral histories 
. . . [and] government documents (laws, bills, proceedings, acts, census records, etc.)”). 
165 See Mark Edwin Burge, Without Precedent: Legal Analysis in the Age of Non-
Judicial Dispute Resolution, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 143, 164–66 (2013). 
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understates the role of other institutions, perhaps a remnant of 
“juriscentrism,” the idea that judges are the primary creators of law.166 
Constitutions have an undisputed place at the top of the hierarchy of 
authority, with enacted law below constitutions, and judicial opinions 
below enacted law. Thus, the rule provided by a statute outranks the 
rule provided in a judicial opinion, but can be trumped by a rule in a 
constitution. But this simple ranking says nothing about the interaction 
between institutional branches, such as when the judiciary interprets 
rules enacted by the legislature. When a court interprets a constitution 
or statute, its role is obviously different than its role in a purely common 
law matter. When interpreting a statute, “[a] judge’s role is subsidiary 
and secondary: subsidiary to the legislature and secondary to the 
agencies.”167 The hierarchy of authority offers no guidance as to what 
other sorts of sources might be used to interpret its rules. There is plenty 
of debate about this, of course, but again, the debate is unmoored from 
the traditional model of authority. 
Developments in administrative law have raised important issues 
about the weight of authority across institutions, such as the 2005 
Supreme Court decision Brand X, which places agency statutory 
interpretation above a judicial interpretation.168 The traditional 
hierarchy of authority has no framework for the rules that allocate and 
evaluate the balance of power between institutions. It is a description 
of authority developed in a different era, when common law dominated 
the legal landscape. A hierarchy that dictates only that “statutes outrank 
166 Edward L. Rubin, Book Review: Statutory Interpretations and the Therapy of the 
Obvious, 68 VAND. L. REV. 159, 162 (2015). 
167 Id. at 173. 
168 Abbe Gluck argues that in its 2005 Brand X decision, “the Supreme Court held that 
agency statutory interpretations of ambiguous statutes sometimes could, and indeed should, 
displace judicial precedents on what those statutes mean—perhaps even U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent. This is a ‘WOW’ moment.” Gluck, 30 Years of Chevron, supra note 101, at 625. 
As a Tenth Circuit judge, Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch raised concerns about the 
role of executive agencies in a strident concurrence:  
There’s an elephant in the room with us today. We have studiously attempted to 
work our way around it and even left it unremarked. But the fact is Chevron and 
Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial 
and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than 
a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. . . . [A]fter 
this court declared the statutes’ meaning and issued a final decision, an executive 
agency was permitted to (and did) tell us to reverse our decision like some sort of 
super court of appeals. 
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–50 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
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judicial decisions” gives no hint of the complex task of interpreting 
enacted law. 
Reams have been written about the appropriate interpretive 
methodology in various contexts, and that controversy is largely about 
which sources of optional authority are appropriate and which should 
be prioritized. Yet, those discussions are largely disconnected from the 
predominant hierarchy of mandatory sources, which is of little use in 
addressing interpretive questions. 
The standard hierarchy of authority as a description fails to capture 
key characteristics of authority, thus failing to capture many 
inconsistencies, peculiarities, and trends in the way that legal authors 
actually use authority. 
III 
TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 
The predominant descriptive tools for authority have remained 
essentially unchanged for the last century and need to be reconsidered. 
The binary description of authority with its central hierarchical 
structure for mandatory authority persists; no widely accepted 
alternative means for understanding and evaluating authority has 
arisen. Those who have addressed the value of optional authority have 
generally tried to extend the hierarchy concept to optional authority, 
attempting to rank sources in a way that mimics the ranking of 
mandatory authority. This sort of effort might be better than none; it 
moves beyond the all-or-nothing valuation of authority. However, it 
perpetuates the notion that all legal authority is an objective, 
autonomous body of information that yields decisions. It continues to 
use a ranking system to stand as a proxy for the valuation of authority. 
For example, law review articles have a designated place on the list: 
lower than court decisions from another jurisdiction but higher than 
legal encyclopedias. But a “better” taxonomy of legal sources is 
insufficient; we must resist the appeal of a neat objective ranking. Legal 
authors craft legal analysis for difficult legal questions using a vast 
array of acceptable legal sources. Their choice of authority varies 
widely given the context, and the factors that determine their choices 
evolve over time. We need a better understanding of how and why legal 
authors use sources of information to support legal analysis and how 
and why they should. 
The first essential step in reimagining concepts of authority—and it 
is admittedly only a first step—is to shift to a holistic, pluralistic view 
2018] Dethroning the Hierarchy of Authority 89
of legal authority, moving beyond the persistent dualistic description 
of authority. A pluralistic view provides a commonsense framework 
for examining the unique ways in which legal authors use authority. 
Most importantly, a pluralistic view of authority allows for more than 
one ultimate principle, accommodating the natural coexistence of 
multiple competing sources of authority and the related flexibility in 
legal argument. It allows for a continuum of weight rather than a binary 
view, and it allows for the evolution of legal authority. A pluralist 
perspective acknowledges that the construction of legal arguments is 
dependent on the legal author’s choice of methodology, emphasizing a 
creative rather than formalist view of legal argument. Describing 
authority in this way forces a shift away from the formalist thinking 
encouraged by a hierarchy and instead encourages close evaluation of 
the purpose and value of each source of information. 
In both the fields of statutory and constitutional interpretation, 
scholars have developed widely-accepted pluralistic models of legal 
argument. Philip Bobbitt labeled six modalities of legitimate 
constitutional argument: historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, 
ethical, and prudential.169 Similarly, William Eskridge and Philip 
Frickey identified multiple sources of argumentation, including textual, 
historical, and evolutive.170 Each of these modalities rests on different 
types of supporting evidence; the choice of modality dictates the choice 
of evidence. Based on these statutory and constitutional interpretation 
models, Wilson Huhn created a broader framework identifying text, 
intent, precedent, tradition, and policy analysis as the five legitimate 
forms of legal argument.171 Like the constitutional and statutory 
interpretation models, Huhn’s model provides a cogent framework for 
169 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 (1991); see also Randy 
Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 1843, 1878–79 (2013) (“Depending on the case, factors such as text, history, 
precedent, justice, political philosophy, and government policy might drive the analysis. . . . 
The best description of the Court’s interpretive approach is not pragmatic but pluralistic.”). 
170 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321–22, 353 (1990); see also Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory 
Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise, 104 NW. L. REV. 1559, 1560 (2010) (“[T]here 
are many legitimate and useful modes of statutory interpretation . . . these methods can look 
very different from one another, and . . . choosing the right one in any given instance is not 
a question of ‘theory’ in the ordinary sense of the term but of appropriateness or ‘fit.’”); 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical 
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1136 (1992) (“The data put into doubt any claims that the 
Supreme Court is strictly originalist or textualist in its approach to statutory cases. The 
Court’s approach is more eclectic, considering a wide range of sources of authority.”). 
171 HUHN, supra note 73, at 14. 
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considering the value and purpose of all types of acceptable authority. 
As Huhn explains, “Each type of legal argument springs from a 
different source of law. Each type of argument functions as a rule of 
recognition. Each type of argument is based upon a different set of 
evidence.”172 
Less important than the exact label or number of categories of 
argument is the explicit recognition of potentially conflicting types of 
legal argument, which rely on different sources of information. The 
concept is not novel. For example, Steven J. Burton recognizes the 
same concept with different vocabulary, noting that “reasons allowed 
by the law may compete.”173 Whether recognizing specific categories 
of legal argument, or simply a broader set of “reasons allowed by the 
law,” a pluralistic framework allows for balancing among sources, 
rather than a strict ranking—a critical difference.  
A hierarchy,174 the current dominant scheme for description of legal 
authority, is organized around a single, uncontradicted principle. As 
such, it cannot capture the strategic and creative reality of legal 
analysis, which often requires the balancing of competing principles. 
Instead of a hierarchy, we need a scheme that allows legal authors to 
recognize, understand, and explain the use of authority as a 
complicated and evolving practice.175 A description of authority as a 
practice that allows for the choice of sources is consistent with a much 
more sophisticated and realistic decision-making process than a 
hierarchy, which suggests no choice and no balancing. A pluralistic 
model of authority acknowledges the indeterminacy of law;176 it allows 
172 Id. at 13. 
173 BURTON, supra note 25, at 90. 
174 The fourth definition of “hierarchy” in the Oxford English Dictionary is “A body of 
persons or things ranked in grades, orders, or classes, one above another.” Interestingly, the 
first three definitions in the OED are religious (implicating a higher authority): (1) each of 
three divisions of angels, (2) rule or dominion in holy things, and (3) the collective body of 
ecclesiastical rulers. Hierarchy, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, (online ed., available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/86792?redirectedFrom=hierarchy#eid) (last visited Jan. 
15, 2017). 
175 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1957. 
176 The indeterminacy of law is a vast and unsettled topic. But for the purpose of 
selecting authority, what is significant is the near consensus that there is some indeterminacy 
in the law—its precise measure is less important. “Legal theory has in this matter a curious 
history; for it is apt either to ignore or to exaggerate the indeterminacies of legal rules.” 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 130 (2d ed. 1994). The existence of some
indeterminacy allows for meaningful choice in the selection of authority to support at least
some subset of legal analysis. Mandatory authority is not definitive in numerous scenarios:
(1) when it does not directly address an issue (an issue of first impression); (2) when one
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for the possibility of more than one answer under more than one 
methodology. It encourages careful thought about why a legal author 
might choose one optional authority over another. 
An author’s choice of legal authority is inextricable from the legal 
reasoning itself. Just as in questions of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation, legal authors can choose to construct an argument based 
on any number of argumentative methodologies, and that choice will 
drive the choice of authority. The most common description of the role 
of optional authority—that legal authors use it to “fill gaps”177—
suggests that a complete picture of the law can be formed if we only 
have enough authority. But the notion that law is moving toward a 
complete and unified body is little more than a fairy tale; there is no 
such end point. The use of optional authority is thus much more 
complex than simply filling gaps. Law is indeterminate in many 
complex ways—filling a gap might suffice to describe the task given 
the lack of law on an issue (a case of first impression), but it is not well 
suited for the other types of indeterminacies. How should a legal author 
authority directly conflicts with another (for example, when two courts of appeal rule 
differently on a similar issue and both are binding on a trial court facing the issue); (3) when 
the authority can be reasonably interpreted in different ways; or (4) when the mandatory 
authority would require a counterintuitive or repugnant result. The classic example is Riggs 
v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889). It is not possible for legal rules to be dispositive in every
situation, and mandatory authority is not always outcome-determinative. Kress, supra note
22, at 283.
Even when parties agree that a case is binding, they are not likely to agree on its meaning. 
Many legal thinkers have sought to find a way to determine and define the part of a case that 
binds future courts; this difficult question remains unresolved. “Taking our cue from 
Moliére, we would find a consensus for the judgment that everything that is not holding is 
dictum and everything that is not dictum is holding, but little in the way of substantive 
definition of either term.” Michael. C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 
2004 (1994). And determining whether the holding of a case applies to the legal problem at 
hand is a similarly complex task, one many scholars have considered. Opinions vary, but 
many have argued that “[s]tare decisis is not binding because cases can always be 
distinguished.” Hiroshi Motomura, Using Judgments as Evidence, 70 MINN. L. REV. 979, 
1017 n.186 (1986).  
Because judges are reluctant to overrule decisions—their preference is for 
“distinguishing” them to death rather than explicitly overruling them, in order 
to preserve the appearance of the law’s continuity and stability—the landscape 
of case law is littered with inconsistent precedents among which current judges 
can pick and choose, resurrecting if need be a precedent that had died but had 
not been given a decent burial. 
POSNER, supra note 2, at 45. Holdings can be crafted narrowly or broadly in order to include 
or exclude a new set of facts. In addition, there are some cases in which the rule dictates a 
clear result, but that result is not acceptable for moral or practical reasons. 
177 See, e.g., NEUMANN, supra note 26, at 79, 86. 
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use optional authority to resolve a conflict between laws, to analyze 
linguistic uncertainty, or to reconcile clear text with a repugnant result? 
The best choice of authority will depend on context, including the type 
of legal argument, the identity of the decision maker, and the extent of 
mandatory authority (if there is any).  
A pluralist framework easily accommodates the complex 
characteristics of authority, including the continuum of weight 
described in Part II above. In fact, the weight metaphor makes much 
more sense in a balancing context than a hierarchical one. Weight, as 
applied to legal sources, is not specific; typically, the most that can be 
said is that one source weighs more or less than another. Greater and 
lesser weights make more sense given a continuum of weight, where 
the value and persuasiveness of sources are relative. Sources are 
balanced against one another, the weight of a source might fall 
anywhere along the spectrum, and that weight can change over time. 
Similarly, abandoning a fixed list of sources as a definition of 
authority accommodates the evolution of authority described above, 
and makes visible the consequences of that evolution. The legal system 
has moved from a primarily common law system with a narrow set of 
vetted sources to a system dominated by enacted law requiring judicial 
interpretation, with a wide open field of unvetted sources. It is much 
easier to list the sources that are not acceptable than those that are. 
Though nonlegal sources have become a routine part of judicial 
decision-making, the profession lacks a means to evaluate those 
sources. The hierarchy has long served as a proxy for value, but it is 
too simplistic. The traditional view of authority suggests that all parties 
agree on the sources to be used; they have all been preapproved by the 
legal system. That view suggests that parties on both sides, as well as 
the judge, all have access to the same information. That is no longer 
true, if it ever was. 
Acknowledging that the profession has moved beyond a closed 
system of sources raises all sorts of questions that have yet to be 
satisfactorily addressed. For example, a party that has unlimited 
resources already has an unfair advantage over a party with limited 
resources: a greater ability to collect and manipulate optional sources. 
Existing ethical rules approved by the profession are limited to 
mandatory authority only (“legal authority in the controlling 
jurisdiction”).178 The choice of authority is arguably more 
178 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
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opportunistic in the optional realm than in the mandatory. Presumably, 
legal authors representing clients will not choose optional authority 
unless its substance supports the client’s position—in fact, an attorney 
arguably has an ethical duty not to include optional authority adverse 
to the client’s position.179 But the calculus seems entirely different for 
judges, who do not have the limitations that accompany client 
representation. As noted above, a related issue in the new world of 
authority is that judges can rely on sources in judicial opinions without 
giving attorneys an opportunity to rebut those sources. Again, this 
practice potentially exacerbates differences in resources. 
We are likely still in the midst of a radical change in information 
access, unable to see its eventual effect on the use of legal sources. But 
we should not wait until the end of that revolution to consider its effect 
on the legal system. 
Using a pluralist scheme in place of a hierarchy has at least two 
apparent advantages in the quest for a deeper understanding of the 
practice of legal authority. First, moving past a binary description of 
authority that minimizes the significance of optional authority creates 
a much better opportunity for understanding why legal authors rely on 
it. The conventional wisdom discourages any theorization of optional 
authority—if judges choose sources based solely on substantive 
content, it is quite difficult to design a general theory that explains their 
choices. In contrast, if judges choose optional authority for 
authoritative reasons in addition to substantive ones, it is possible to 
explain and better predict those choices. Thus, recognizing an evolving 
continuum of authoritative weight is not just a matter of semantics. A 
pluralistic model makes the role of optional authority visible, 
encouraging its theorization. 
Second, developing a cogent theory for the use of optional authority 
would, in turn, support the development of a better predictive model of 
authority. The oversimplification of authority with a hierarchical, 
binary model discourages a closer look at the complicated practices of 
authority. A more complete, pluralist model encourages legal authors 
and scholars to consider the value of legal authority in particular 
contexts. The landscape of authority is not fixed and flat; authority is 
used differently depending on factors such as the field of law, the 
identity of the decision maker, the reason why the legal question is a 
179 But see Stephen G. A. Pitel & Yu Seon Gadsen-Chung, Reconsidering a Lawyer’s 
Obligation to Raise Adverse Authority, 49 UBC L. REV. 521, 522 (arguing that a lawyer 
should be required to raise not only binding but relevant authority of which she is aware). 
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difficult one, and the amount or quality of mandatory authority on the 
issue. A pluralist model including optional authority would foster a 
more nuanced understanding of optional authority, encouraging both 
lawyers and judges to make more thoughtful choices about sources of 
authority. When legal authors face difficult jurisprudential issues, no 
model or taxonomy of authority will suffice. But we can at least be 
more transparent about our practices. 
A. Developing a Theory to Explain the Use of Optional Authority
While mandatory authority is typically justified by well-developed
theories based on values such as fairness, efficiency, uniformity, and 
judicial economy,180 little has been written on the theory of optional 
authority. According to one scholar, the prevalence of citation to 
optional authority may be best described as a “strong professionalism 
norm.”181 Another suggests that judges “defer to other judges out of 
respect or perhaps a desire for geographical consistency and 
stability.”182 According to former Judge Alex Kozinski, it would 
simply be “bad form”183 to ignore the existing authority (he refers to 
“other courts and commentators”) on an issue.184 A recent treatise on 
judicial precedent relies on Black’s Law Dictionary for the explanation 
that a nonbinding decision is “not binding on a court but is nonetheless 
entitled to respect and careful consideration.”185 None of these 
explanations are based solely on the substantive merits of the authority 
cited—they all suggest content-independent reasons for relying on 
nonbinding authority. 
Yet, despite this tacit recognition, whether, why, and to what extent 
judges defer to optional authority for content-independent reasons 
remains largely unexplored. The conventional wisdom around optional 
authority—that it is chosen based solely on its merits—is likely the 
primary reason why. The hierarchical model perpetuates that 
conventional wisdom by paying so little attention to optional authority. 
As a result, the prevalence of optional authority remains largely 
unexplained. 
180 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 29.  
181 Sullivan,  supra note 11, at 1147. 
182 Lindquist & Cross, supra note 22, at 1162. 
183 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001). 
184 Id. (“So long as the earlier authority is acknowledged and considered, courts are 
deemed to have complied with their common law responsibilities.”). 
185 GARNER ET AL., supra note 63 (internal citation omitted). 
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Any sophisticated understanding of authority must recognize the 
authoritative value of optional authority, viewing it as an integrated part 
of legal authority as a whole. Once the content-independent value of 
authority is recognized, it is possible to better understand why legal 
authors choose to cite it and how its use relates to that of mandatory 
authority. Even though the use of optional authority is not restricted by 
any formal rules, it is constrained by something. The freedom to choose 
sources when constructing legal arguments does not appear to include 
the freedom to leave out sources altogether. And it does not include the 
freedom to rely solely, for example, on intuition or a roll of the dice 
when mandatory sources do not dictate a particular result. Instead, the 
law’s persistent conservative nature—resting on a foundation of 
objectivity—drives the citation of all types of sources in legal 
argument—mandatory or optional—for authoritative, content-
independent reasons. As a result, legal analysis today is built on a 
peculiar and possibly paradoxical system in which authors choose 
among a virtually unlimited set of sources for the authority they wish 
to be governed by.  
The idea that optional authority might have authoritative value is not 
entirely surprising. Given our “rule of law” ideal, it makes sense that 
legal decision makers would turn to authority even when not required 
to do so.186 Jeremy Waldron argues that in a rule of law system, a judge 
must ask herself what the law requires:  
Once she determines that there is no established rule that bears 
directly and explicitly on the situation before her, then surely the 
question she should ask herself is this: “What bearing, then, does the 
law have on this situation, even if it is indirect or implicit?” She must 
stay in touch with the law; she must try “to relate the grounds of the 
present determination in some reasoned fashion to previously 
established principles and policies and rules and standards.”187  
Citing to any authority—binding or optional—accomplishes this 
purpose. The authoritative reasons for relying on optional authority 
overlap substantially with the reasons justifying reliance on binding 
authority, if to a lesser degree. Justifications for a system of mandatory 
authority are continually examined and questioned by scholars, but the 
essential themes are constant. Relying on past authority is thought to 
186 “[P]ublic respect depends on a perception that the Court’s decisions are governed by 
the rule of law, and not by the vagaries of the political process.” Lee, supra note 71, at 653. 
187 Waldron, supra note 134, at 15 (citing HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 569 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip Frickey eds., 1994)). 
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have “several theoretical virtues,”188 including coherence, stability, 
predictability, fairness and equity, and efficiency.189 These values 
apply to optional authority as well as mandatory authority. For 
example, uniformity, a broad concept which includes many of the most 
oft-cited reasons for a rule-of-law system, offers a content-independent 
reason for citing to optional authority.190 If uniformity is valued, 
existing decisions have value whether they are binding or not. Chad 
Flanders has argued that uniformity supports the use of nonbinding 
case law.191 His examples include when federal circuit courts cite other 
circuit courts, when state courts look to other state courts to interpret 
the common law, and when courts in one state consider how other states 
have interpreted a uniform act.192 
Consensus is another logical reason to cite optional authority; it is 
closely related to uniformity but not identical. Citing to a source 
because it indicates consensus or majority on a matter could stem from 
a desire for uniform interpretation of law. But it could also reflect a 
belief that the majority view on an issue is more likely to be right—the 
Condorcet Theorem—as Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein argue.193 
Citing to show consensus on an issue is a content-independent reason 
for citing to authority—what many call “nose-counting.”194 Again, this 
justification applies to optional authority just as well as to mandatory 
authority. It may encourage a court to look to the law of other states, or 
to the law of other nations. 
Some of the theoretical purposes behind mandatory authority 
support the citation of sources that are never binding. For example, the 
188 Lindquist & Cross, supra note 22, at 1159. 
189 Kozel, supra note 169, at 1859; see also Waldron, supra note 134, at 3 (In Jeremy 
Waldron’s view, “Our jurisprudence is cluttered with a haphazard variety of considerations 
adduced to justify stare decisis. They include the importance of stability, respect for 
established expectations, decisional efficiency, the orderly development of the law, Burkean 
deference to ancestral wisdom, formal or comparative justice, fairness, community, 
integrity, the moral importance of treating like cases alike, and the political desirability of 
disciplining our judges and reducing any opportunity for judicial activism.”). 
190 Caminker, supra note 29, at 850–54 (Caminker identifies interests served by 
uniformity as predictability, efficient administration, equal treatment under the law, and 
respect for judicial authority—“[i]n sum, consistent interpretation and application of law 
can secure several important values undergirding a government dedicated to the rule of 
law.”). 
191 See Flanders, supra note 11, at 76; see also Dobbins, supra note 27, at 1493 n.122.  
192 Flanders, supra note 11, at 76–79. 
193 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 
131 (2006). 
194 Young, supra note 61, at 150–51. 
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goals of uniformity and consensus can support reliance on secondary 
sources, which often reflect the majority rule.195 Melvin Eisenberg has 
pointed out that “in the absence of a local binding precedent the 
national-law rule will often be treated in virtually the same way as such 
a precedent.”196 Practices of other states provide useful information 
when “those practices reflect the judgment of the affected population 
or decision makers; the other state is sufficiently similar; and the 
judgment embodied in the practice of the other state is independent.”197 
Thus, restatements, uniform laws, and even treatises can be cited to 
show uniformity and consensus, even though they are never binding. 
In some instances, a restatement will be a more “authoritative” source 
than a single judicial opinion from another jurisdiction, contradicting 
the conventional wisdom that primary authority is always more 
valuable than secondary. 
Efficiency as an authoritative justification has been well explored in 
the context of binding authority, but it can easily be used to justify 
reliance on nonbinding authority as well. Evan Caminker explains that 
a court might follow precedent simply to avoid “reinventing the 
wheel” by engaging in start-to-finish legal analysis, thus allowing a 
judge both to avoid becoming mired in unfamiliar legal thickets, and 
to concentrate her energies on interesting issues in which she wishes 
to develop expertise. Indeed, frequent adherence to precedent is a 
prerequisite to effective adjudication: Courts simply do not have the 
time to fully address each legal issue raised by every case.198 
Expertise is another reason for relying on authority, and expertise 
does not depend on binding status. Optional authority may be relied 
upon because the source is deemed an expert in an area. To use 
Schauer’s example, a nonbinding decision from the Second Circuit on 
a securities issue may carry extra weight because that particular court 
is deemed an expert on such issues.199 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit is 
deemed to have expertise in administrative matters.200 More generally, 
195 Posner and Sunstein note, “In private law, the practice of determining law in a 
particular state by reference to the ‘majority rule’ is so common as to be virtually invisible; 
this is also usually what state courts do when they rely on restatements.” Posner & Sunstein, 
supra note 193, at 171. 
196 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Concept of National Law and the Rule of Recognition, 29 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1229, 1250 (2002); see also POSNER, supra note 2, at 211.  
197 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 193, at 136. 
198 Caminker, supra note 29, at 827. 
199 FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 71 (2009). 
200 Margolis, supra note 16, at 915.  
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according to Charles Sullivan, the “judging norm” of looking to 
nonbinding decisions  
can be functionally justified by the expectation that decisions, the 
result of a presumably effective adversary process and presumably 
considered deliberation by several judges, all of whom are neutral at 
least in the sense of being personally disinterested in the outcome, 
are more likely to be correct and well-reasoned than, say, an op-ed in 
the local newspaper.201  
Expertise might also be viewed as a justification for citing to social 
science and other similar nonlegal resources, but as noted above, the 
problem with relying on such sources is the lack of any system for 
evaluating them. In the legal realm, expertise might be viewed as a 
reason to cite to traditional secondary authority.202 In another era, 
treatises like Williston and Corbin on contracts were often cited in this 
manner.203 The benefits of a treatise synthesizing existing cases is 
useful now for slightly different reasons—the overwhelming number 
of decisions rather than difficulty in accessing them. 
Integrity and legitimacy, often cited in support of a binding law 
system, are perhaps the most ubiquitous authoritative reasons for citing 
to optional authority. Citation to authority suggests that the judge is 
acting for principled, legal reasons—with integrity. It is thus not at all 
surprising that in a rule of law system judges rely on what has gone 
before, even when not required to do so. Stephen Barnett argues that 
the “habit of stare decisis is hard-wired into the brains of common law 
judges. And, other things being equal, it is easier to follow a lead than 
to blaze one’s own trail.”204 Randy Kozel describes it as “stage 
setting”— “the existence of the precedents is used to suggest that the 
201 Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1200–01. 
202 As Judge Posner notes that  
a mature or complete rule is more likely to have been reconstructed from a line of 
cases than to be found fully and precisely stated and explained in the latest case in 
the line. It falls to the law professors to clean up after the judges by making explicit 
in treatises, articles and restatements of the law the rules implicit in the various 
lines of cases, identifying outliers, explicating policy grounds, and charting the 
path of future development. 
POSNER, supra note 2, at 211. However, this “type of legal scholarship . . . is no longer in 
vogue at the leading law schools.” Id. 
203 Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 263 (1987). 
204 Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West’s Federal Appendix: The 
Ground Shifts Under No Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 11 (2002). 
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subsequent court’s ruling represents an unremarkable application of 
established principles.”205 
The legal practice of following earlier decisions—just because they 
were made first—is not limited to mandatory authority. The concept of 
path dependence206 applies to optional authority just as well as 
mandatory. Path dependence can be seen as a category of weight—the 
mere existence of a prior decision can influence a decision maker. 
“Indeed, reliance on precedent as a basis for decision-making is 
relatively common, even in nonlegal contexts where prior actions have 
no legally binding effect, as well as in systems of civil law that typically 
do not recognize the force of precedent.”207 An extreme example of 
path dependence is what Brian Soucek has identified and labeled as 
“copy-paste precedent”—unpublished opinions that are followed 
(actually copied word for word) without being either cited or quoted, 
even in instances when the standard followed was actually incorrect.208 
Providing authenticity—countering the perception of judicial 
whimsy—is what the use of optional authority seems to accomplish on 
many occasions. “A distinct defense of reliance on precedent is the 
assurance that judges will not decide capriciously, for personal rather 
than legal reasons,”209 and this reason is easily extended to optional 
authority. Law is often described as conservative, and Schauer argues 
it is common practice to give weight to earlier decisions simply because 
they came first. “That is, a legal argument is often understood to be a 
better legal argument just because someone has made it before, and a 
legal conclusion is typically taken to be a better one if another court 
205 Kozel, supra note 169, at 1851 (Kozel argues that this practice, though 
“nonconstraining . . . may even supply an element of ‘lawyerly authenticity.’”) 
206 Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 903 (2005); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern
of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 606 (2001) (“The doctrine
of stare decisis thus creates an explicitly path dependent process.”).
207 Lindquist & Cross, supra note 22, at 1166 (citing Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987)); see also Scott Hamilton Dewey, How Judges Don’t Think: The 
Inadvertent Misuse of Precedent in the Strange Career of the Illinois Doctrine of 
Antagonistic Defenses 1876–1985, 9 J. JURIS. 59, 64 (2011). 
208 Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 J. APP. PRACT. PROC. 153, 153 (2012) 
(“These decisions shape the course of the law not because they are binding—they explicitly 
are not—but simply because portions of their text get repeatedly copied and pasted into other 
unpublished opinions.”). 
209 Lindquist & Cross, supra note 22, at 1160. 
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either reached it or credited it on an earlier occasion.”210 He describes 
this as using citation in order to “deny genuine novelty.”211 
At this end of the spectrum, any citation at all makes some sense. In 
other words, a legal author may cite simply to establish that the idea 
originated elsewhere, thus giving the idea more influence in the 
conservative (backward-facing) legal world. The legal author cites it 
simply to “deny genuine novelty.” 212 A “decision without principled 
justification would be no judicial act at all.”213 At this end of the 
spectrum, some argue that citations may be nothing more than window 
dressing,214 a mask,215 and as such inconsequential. “In this vision, the 
Justices first choose their preferred outcome, based on ideological or 
other considerations, and then seek out precedents to cite in support of 
that outcome.”216 But even if this is true, the practice of citation is still 
worthy of attention. “[T]he fabric of law,” as Gluck explains, is formed 
through judicial opinions.217 Thus, she states, methodology within 
those opinions matters “[e]ven if one cannot prove that methodology 
dictates outcomes.”218 
B. Developing a Better Predictive Model of Authority
Understanding why legal authors cite to optional authority helps to 
better predict legal outcomes and persuade judges—to improve what 
210 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1950. 
211 Id. at 1950–51 (“[T]he conventions of legal citation do not appear to require only 
strong (authoritative) support. Rather, the conventions seem to require that a proposition be 
supported by a reference to some court (or other source) that has previously reached that 
conclusion, even if other courts or sources have reached a different and mutually exclusive 
conclusion, and even if there are more of the latter than the former. Thus, to support a legal 
proposition with a citation is often only to do no more than say that at least one person has 
said the same thing on some previous occasion.”).  
212 Schauer, Authority, supra note 4, at 1951. 
213 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992); see also Margolis, 
supra note 16, at 921 (“The citation conventions of legal writing instruct that some citation 
is better than no citation. The culture of citation is so entrenched that the mere fact of a 
citation lends some authority to the statement being cited.”). 
214 POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 156, at 300 (“[Canons of statutory 
construction are] at best window dressing; at worst the emperor’s new clothes in Hans 
Christian Anderson’s tale of that name.”). 
215 Frank B. Cross, James F. Spriggs II, Timothy R. Johnson & Paul J. Wahlbeck, 
Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use and Significance, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 500 (2010). 
216 Id. at 501. 
217 Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 94, at 1855. 
218 Id. at 1768. 
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Melvin Eisenberg has called the “replicability” of judicial reasoning. 
The legal profession is based on the assumption that lawyers can help 
to predict legal outcomes. “Granted that it is desirable for lawyers as 
well as judges to be able to determine the law, it becomes critical that 
lawyers should be able to replicate the process of judicial reasoning 
and, therefore, that the courts utilize a process of reasoning that is 
replicable by lawyers.”219 If we have no theory to explain the reasons 
why judges rely on particular materials, replicability becomes ever 
more difficult. We should not be satisfied with the explanation that a 
judge might rely on any acceptable optional sources, particularly when 
that category of sources has come to mean just about anything. 
A hierarchical model suggests a one-size-fits-all approach for legal 
analysis, but that approach is belied by the huge amount of variety in 
legal problems. A hierarchy of authority cannot accommodate deep 
jurisprudential questions; it leaves out the human element of legal 
reasoning. For hard legal questions, a legal author must go beyond the 
mandatory sources, taking into account subtler considerations than the 
hierarchy recognizes. If the case is difficult because it presents an issue 
of first impression, a legal author will likely choose different sources 
than if the case is difficult because its facts do not fit an established 
rule. The author of a difficult antitrust argument might rely heavily on 
a well-known treatise, while the author of a difficult discrimination 
case might rely heavily on social science data. A legal author in state 
court might rely on different sources than a legal author with a similar 
issue in federal court. Authority has different value in different 
contexts. 
The identity of the particular decision maker is perhaps the most 
obvious factor in choosing authority. However, the most studied 
context—the Supreme Court—is unique. Many insights gained from 
examining the use of authority by the Supreme Court are just not 
applicable in other contexts. The Supreme Court lies at one end of the 
spectrum, with its focus on the most difficult national questions and 
operating only under a “soft” version of stare decisis; it is the court 
most open to optional authority. Robert Berring argues that “[f]or the 
modern Supreme Court there is no final primary authority, only a 
kaleidoscope of sources that one can shift to provide any of a number 
of pictures.”220 The use of optional authority in lower courts—both 
219 MELVIN EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 11 (1988). 
220 Berring, Cognitive Authority, supra note 131, at 1690. 
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state and federal—is quite different than that in the Supreme Court and 
deserves closer study. Consider that disputes are increasingly resolved 
by arbitrators who may not be subject to the traditional hierarchy of 
authority at all. A New York Times series on arbitration included an 
example of a case in which a contract dictated that the “supreme 
authority” was to be the holy scripture.221 As dispute resolution outside 
of the courtroom increases, traditional rules regarding the hierarchy of 
authority arguably become less useful.222 
Legal authors ought to consider why the legal issue is a difficult one 
because such a consideration might drive the choice of authority. The 
current categorization of all optional authority as simply “other than 
mandatory” offers no practical guidance for its use. But the type of 
legal issue—including the nature of the substantive field—is 
significant. If the question is one of first impression, a legal author has 
the most freedom to choose authority.223 If the difficult question is one 
of interpretation, it is routine for legal authors to rely on sources such 
as legislative history, dictionaries, canons of construction, or agency 
decisions for their authoritative status. If the question is difficult for 
policy reasons, it is routine for legal authors to turn to factual sources 
of information—arguably not for their authoritative status, but for their 
substantive content. 
The choice of optional authority always depends on the existing 
mandatory authority on an issue. Duncan Kennedy’s “field 
configurations”224 concept captures this important piece; the use of 
optional authority is supplemental to the use of mandatory. As Kennedy 
explains:  
The constraint imposed by the law is that it defines the distance 
that I will have to work through in legal argument if I decide to come 
out the way I initially thought I wanted to. “The law” constrains in 
221 Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration, Scripture is 
the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/ 
business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html [https://nyti.ms 
/1KVPvRU]; see also W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and 
Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2012) (“[A]rbitrators who write reasoned 
awards behave much like judges . . . . They write detailed awards that make extensive use 
of precedent, although perhaps to a slightly lesser degree than judges.”). 
222 See Mark Edwin Burge, Without Precedent: Legal Analysis in the Age of Non-
Judicial Dispute Resolution, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 143 (2013). 
223 Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical 
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 534–42 (1986). 
224 Id. at 538. 
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that it is an element of the situation as I initially experience it. It is 
the “field” of my action.225  
The “impacted field,” for example, is the most constraining, because 
it contains “a substantial number of cases distributed in a regular 
pattern along the boundary, dispelling any doubt that the rule means 
what it says.”226 The case of first impression is at the opposite end of 
the spectrum, and in between are a vast number of other scenarios. The 
binary view of authority masks this complicated relationship, 
discouraging the development of strategies of how to work in any of 
Kennedy’s fields—what optional authority will work best in any given 
field? 
For example, a lawyer researching a state law property issue might 
rely heavily on the Restatement of Property for an established common 
law principle that has not been explicitly recognized by her state’s 
courts. (For example, the rights of a property owner when he discovers 
that one wall of his building has long been shared with an adjoining 
building). In that context, the restatement, a secondary source, 
represents the consensus of many states (party walls can be established 
by prescriptive easement) and is highly persuasive. It is likely to be 
much more persuasive than a single decision from a court of appeals in 
Kansas, a primary source. A field of law is not completely empty just 
225 Id. at 530. 
Of course, each field is different from every other one. But in the gestalt process 
by which we grasp it, we employ—albeit nonreflectively—what we might call 
“configuration-types.” We get a cognitive grip on the particularity of a given field 
by relating it to one or more of these types, distorting it in the process. We can 
loosely array configuration-types according to how impacted they are. By this I 
mean that some fields seem to offer more opportunities for one kind or another of 
legal argument than others. 
Id. at 538. 
226 Id. Kennedy identifies more ambiguous fields with significant opportunity for 
effective legal argument: “The unrationalized field” includes lots of cases decided on their 
facts, “with minimal argumentation and narrow or conclusory or obviously logically 
defective holdings.” Id. at 540. “The contradictory field” contains lots of cases on both 
sides—“an extremely complex structure shot through with interstices.” Id. at 541. The other 
categories are the “the collapsed field,” where “the policy arguments on one side of the 
boundary get restated so as to abolish the boundary,” and “the loopified field,” which 
“makes people uptight . . . . when supposedly easy cases in the heartlands of the territories 
of the opposing rules seem closer together (around the back, so to speak) than cases that are 
opposite one another along the boundary.” Id. 
104 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 51 
because there is no binding decision available, and secondary authority 
can be more persuasive than primary.227 
In contrast, consider a 2017 federal criminal law case in the Tenth 
Circuit, where the prosecution sought to admit evidence under the 
doctrine of chances, a controversial evidentiary doctrine.228 The 
doctrine had not been adopted in the Tenth Circuit and had barely been 
alluded to by a Supreme Court decision. The prosecution cited to a 
1994 state law case in Washington and a 1991 Seventh Circuit decision, 
and the trial court relied heavily on both decisions in its order.229 In 
that instance, with no widely accepted longstanding common law 
principle, and in a scenario with compelling facts quite similar to the 
past cases cited, the court found the nonbinding cases to be compelling. 
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court result, but 
put the optional authority in a footnote,230 choosing to frame the 
decision as one that was determined by the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and did not require application of the doctrine of chances. In other 
words, a legal author has the choice of authority even when binding 
authority exists—the framing of the legal issue dictates the applicable 
authority. This interaction between the selection of authority and 
framing of the legal issue deserves further exploration. 
Eliminating the metaphorical wall between mandatory and optional 
authority created by the traditional view of authority facilitates scrutiny 
of the relationship between the two. In a pluralistic model, mandatory 
and optional authority can be seen as related parts of a legal argument, 
not wholly separate (and opposite) concepts. For example, an argument 
based on intent “may be drawn from the text of the law itself, from 
previous versions of the text, from its drafting history, from official 
comments, or from contemporary commentary.”231 As Wilson Huhn 
points out, arguments based on intent are found in nearly every area of 
law—interpretation of constitutions, statutes, regulations, and private 
documents like contracts and wills. Evidence of intent, such as 
legislative history, is not a mandatory source of law but is used to 
supplement the text. Arguments based on text and precedent rely 
227 This may seem obvious to practitioners, but it is not so obvious to new legal authors, 
as my use of this issue as a course assignment indicated. 
228 See United States v. Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2017). 
229 United States v. Henthorn, No. 14-CR-000448 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 2014) (order 
denying motion in limine in part).  
230 Henthorn, 864 F.3d at 1252, n.8. 
231 HUHN, supra note 73, at 34. 
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primarily on mandatory sources, but not exclusively. Plain meaning 
arguments rely on a mandatory source, of course, the text itself. But 
they might also rely on a dictionary, or a canon of construction—both 
optional authority. Interpretive tools have a natural place in this 
perspective of authority. 
Unlike the traditional hierarchy, a pluralistic model also recognizes 
arguments based entirely on optional sources of authority, 
acknowledging their legitimacy. For example, arguments based on 
tradition are also typically based on optional sources of authority, as 
tradition-based arguments include historical evidence of “people’s 
beliefs and behavior patterns over decades or centuries.”232 And of 
course, policy arguments typically do not rely on traditional sources of 
authority, but on nonlegal sources, as described above. “Policy analysis 
differs from the other four types of legal arguments in that the scope of 
information that the court may draw on is virtually unlimited.”233 As 
Ellie Margolis has noted in teaching legal analysis to students, policy 
argumentation has traditionally been treated only in a cursory way.234 
This is likely due, in great part, to its reliance on sources that do not 
appear on the traditional hierarchy of authority. 
An integrated view of mandatory and optional authority makes it 
possible to develop cohesive strategies for their use—strategies which 
can evolve as practices change. The evolution of optional sources 
cannot be completely divorced from binding authority practices. 
Permissible sources of authority are fluid—optional sources (and even 
nonlegal sources) can become effectively mandatory sources when 
courts cite to them consistently—a kind of bootstrapping. Judicial 
citations to optional sources give that source at least a place in the 
established legal dialogue.235 The “weight” of a source shifts after it 
has been cited. This is the sort of subtlety that a fixed hierarchy cannot 
capture. 
232 Id. at 45. 
233 Id. at 66. 
234 Ellis Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy Arguments in 
Appellate Briefs, 62 MONT. L. REV. 59, 63 (2001). 
235 John Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme 
Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 619 (1954) (“This addition of prestige to a work 
by judicial citation has an unavoidable effect on future decisions. As a work increases in 
stature it becomes more authoritative—more capable of influencing the actual consideration 
of cases by judges.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1206 (“When persuasive authority 
accumulates in a particular direction (which, of course, is likely) the result may well be to 
strongly influence the course of the law in a way not indicated by its formal status.”). 
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For example, Allison Orr Larsen points out that lower courts use 
Supreme Court factual claims in an authoritative way. In cases she 
examined,  
the courts cite the actual Supreme Court language in the U.S. Reports 
without always including the original factual source. It must matter 
to these lower courts that the Justices used the authority once 
before—the Supreme Court citation gives the source an extra bump 
of persuasive power supplemental to the power it contains 
independently.236  
Larsen doubts the Supreme Court’s competence as an authority on 
factual claims: “no supplemental authoritative force—no extra 
persuasive bump—should attach to the factual sources because they 
appeared in the U.S. Reports.”237  
Again, no formal rules govern the use of such sources, and Larsen 
concludes that “[t]he current rule seems to be to use them when it is 
convenient and to avoid them when it is not.”238 Whether this lack of 
consistency is a significant problem may be up for debate, but this 
problem is invisible if legal authority is seen as entirely binary. Only 
by digging into the complexities of authority—dicta can have weight; 
citation of nonbinding sources can give them a weight they didn’t 
previously have—can the impact of these citation practices be seen. 
Strategies for choosing optional authority are not well articulated 
anywhere. Undoubtedly, experienced practitioners develop the skill of 
choosing authority in their particular field, and perhaps that expertise 
is passed on by word-of-mouth. But it is difficult to find any written 
explanation beyond the tips for choosing case law from outside the 
jurisdiction, leaving many interesting questions unanswered. Optional 
authority in the legal realm is unique in that the content-independent 
reason for citing it is not the sole reason.239 If that is the case, which 
reason comes first—the source’s status or its content? According to 
Chad Flanders, “The ‘authority’ will be initially consulted because 
it/he/she is an authority; the decision to follow that authority, however, 
will be based on that authority’s reasons.”240 But the process seems to 
236 Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 153, at 104. 
237 Id. at 107. 
238 Id. at 86. 
239 J. Raz, Authority and Justification, in AUTHORITY 115, 124 (Joseph Raz ed., N.Y. 
Univ. Press 1990) (“The fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason 
for its performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing 
what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them.” (emphasis omitted)). 
240 Flanders, supra note 11, at 67 n.53. 
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happen in the reverse direction as well. At least anecdotally, 
supervising attorneys often ask their subordinates to find a case that 
stands for a particular principle. Once such a case is found, its 
authoritative value might then be considered—if more than one source 
offers the same principle, a legal author likely chooses based on its 
perceived authoritative status. The choice of argument seems to dictate 
the choice of optional authority, not the other way around. 
All this suggests that there is a great deal of work to be done in 
examining the use of authority in legal argument—both practical and 
theoretical. I hope that this Article will prompt a closer look at legal 
authority practices. 
CONCLUSION 
Authority is the foundation of legal analysis: there is no real 
understanding of legal analysis without an understanding of how and 
why sources are chosen to construct it. The distinction between binding 
and nonbinding authority might be significant, but it is only the 
beginning of the story of authority. The once well-defined, limited 
world of legal authority has expanded exponentially, so that it now 
includes anything and everything cited, and authors face more choices 
of authority than ever. Today’s legal authors cannot effectively 
understand optional authority if the profession persists in treating such 
authority as a source used only for its substantive content, and the fixed 
hierarchy remains the customary description of authority. The 
continued predominance of the hierarchical model discourages a 
deeper exploration of the issues surrounding legal authority. By 
oversimplifying the use of authority, it encourages only a surface-level 
understanding, overshadowing the valuable insights of many scholars. 
It particularly disadvantages law students, law clerks, and other new 
lawyers, leaving them to discover on their own how to use authority in 
practice. 
Many unanswered questions about authority deserve to be 
addressed. Is our current judicial system equipped to handle the 
increasingly open universe of acceptable sources? Should we have 
guidelines that help to define the relative expertise of a source? Are 
there any ethical principles at all guiding the use of optional authority? 
Should there be? Does the increasing array of sources give an 
advantage to parties with more resources? Will, and should, the line 
between mandatory and optional authority eventually disappear? The 
traditional hierarchy of authority impedes thoughtful discussion of 
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these sorts of questions. We need a wider lens and more flexible 
framework to encourage thoughtful examination of how legal authors 
actually use authority to craft legal analysis. 
